The Effect of National Culture on Partner Buyouts in Cross-Border Biotechnology Alliances by Folta, Timothy B. & Ferrier, Walter J.
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Purdue CIBER Working Papers Krannert Graduate School of Management
1-1-1999
The Effect of National Culture on Partner Buyouts





Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Folta, Timothy B. and Ferrier, Walter J., "The Effect of National Culture on Partner Buyouts in Cross-Border Biotechnology Alliances"
(1999). Purdue CIBER Working Papers. Paper 142.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp/142
.-----~-----___c;----.---- ..----~~---
PUR 0 U E
=)/1 stE
CIBER
- Center for InternationalBusiness Education and Research
Walter J. Ferrier
University ojKentucky
The Effect of National Culture on Partner Buyouts
in Cross-Border Biotechnology Alliances
Timothy B. Folta
Purdue University
Krannert Gmduate School ofManagement
Purdue University
1310 Krannert Building




THE EFFECT OF NATIONAL CULTURE ON PARTNER BUYOUTS IN
CROSS-BORDER BIOTECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES
T!MOlHY B. FOLTA














~ r'~~~,roA I ~
Revised manuscrip Stll:HfHuea ~e the Journal of High Technology Management Research
We are grateful to Bob Dahlstrom. Andrew Inkpen, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an
earlier version of this paper, and to Kent Miller for his help on a related project. An earlier version of this paper
appeared in the 1997 Academy ofManagement Best Paper Proceedings.
THE EFFECT OF NATIONAL CULTURE ON PARTNER BUYOUTS IN CROSS-BORDER
BIOTECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES
ABSTRACT
This study examines how national culture influences the likelihood and rate of buyouts
among R&D equity alliances and joint ventures in the biotechnology industry. We hypothesize
that the interaction of specific national culture attributes and cultural differences between alliance
partners bear upon: a) the amount of endogenous uncertainty surrounding the potential
integration of the target firm and b) the marginal rate of learning in hierarchical versus
collaborative governance. Applying a competing hazard model to a sample of 173 joint ventures
and minority equity collaborations in the biotechnology industry, we found that investing firms
from high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance countries are more likely to buyout
their alliance partners. Furthermore, greater cultural distance between alliance partners increases
the likelihood of partner buyout when investing firms are from high power distance countries.
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As knowledge-intensive industries become increasingly global, high tech firms are
confronted with the strategic challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with cross-border
alliances. Indeed, considerable managerial and scholarly attention has been paid to not only the
benefits of such alliances, but also on the transactional difficulties wrought by alliance partners
from different national cultures. However, most of these efforts have focused on the choice of
initial governance mode (e.g., Erramilli, 1996; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Shane, 1993). The present
study is motivated in three respects. First, it is becoming clear that governance decisions may
involve a strategy to sequentially invest equity in an alliance partner over time (Chang, 1995;
Penner-Hahn, 1998). Second, partnerships often terminate with acquisition (Folta, 1998; Hurry,
Kogut, 1991; Miller & Bowman, 1992) as opposed to other forms of termination, such as
dissolution or third party buyouts. Third, little research to date has explicitly examined whether
national culture characteristics influence patterns of sequential investment and the particular
mode of alliance termination.
This paper is an attempt to fill the gaps noted above by examining the role of national
culture on the likelihood and rate of buyouts among R&D equity alliances and joint ventures in
the biotechnology industry. Partner buyouts are a relatively common occurrence in other
knowledge-intensive industries. For example, Park and Russo (1996) found that 16.2 percent of
joint ventures in the electronics industry were acquired within three years of founding, while
Choi (1991) has found that 13.6 percent of minority investments ended in acquisition within one
year of initiation. I Yet, despite their frequency, very few studies have explicitly treated partner
buyouts as a distinct form of partnership termination. This is unfortunate because Park and
Russo (1996) and Park and Ungson (1997) argue that termination by acquisition and termination
by dissolution may be driven by entirely different factors.
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Like our study, Kogut (1991) examined the partner buyout decision through an option theory
lens. Whereas his study examines the role of exogenous factors on buyouts, our focus is on
endogenous uncertainty and the impact of national culture. To date, only Park and Ungson
(1997) have examined the role of national culture on the partner buyout decision. They reveal
some evidence that cultural distance increases the likelihood of buyout of the joint venture, even
after controlling for other important factors such as organizational and operational differences
between partners, the type of transaction, and the incidence of prior transactions between
partners. Unfortunately, since their focus was termination by dissolution, they do not develop
any a priori theoretical arguments about the determinants of buyouts. Neither do they offer any
empirical evidence regarding the effects of dimensions of culture other than cultural distance.
There are other reasons to believe that national culture may play an important role in the
partner buyout decision. Chang (1995) and Hurry et al. (1992) found that sequential investment
patterns were found to differ across U.S. and Japanese venture capital firms. Relative to U.S.
firms, Japanese firms exhibit incremental approaches to expansion. Subsequent to news
indicating venture success, Japanese venture capital firms tended to upgrade a venture investment
to a joint venture or acquisition, while U.S. firms tended to sell their ownership stake. Chang
(1995) questions whether the sequential investment pattern holds for western firms, reasoning
that cultural and institutional background of non-western firm favor an incremental and
evolutionary approach to investment. Although he does not test this proposition, he encourages
study of the matter.
Hofstede (1980) defined national culture as the collective programming of the human mind.
His dimensions of culture are well known and include uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
masculinity-femininity, and individualism and vary considerably across countries.
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Understanding which cultural dimensions bear upon the decision to buyout a partner may shed
. light on several important issues. For instance, investing firms in knowledge-intensive industries
would benefit from knowing how target firms from different cultures tend to respond to
sequential investment behavior by partners. This ex ante knowledge may prove helpful in
negotiating the terms of R&D equity collaborations. Similarly, collaborating firms would be
advised to understand whether foreign partners are likely to consider them an acquisition
candidate. At a broader level, national culture may have significant implications for
understanding the level and type of commitment firms make in emerging, high tech industries.
We explicitly examine the effects of national culture on the rate of partner buyout across
twelve different countries. Our hypotheses are developed using aggregate measures of cQltural
distance by Hofstede (1980) and Ronen and Shenkar (1985), as well as more specific dimensions
of culture relating to the investing firm. Using a time varying model, we test these hypotheses on
a sample of minority investments and joint ventures in the biotechnology industry. In the past
two decades, the biotechnology industry has grown explosively, largely due to the recognition
that biotechnology could disrupt old markets, create new products, and cheapen current
manufacturing process. Virtually every developed country has targeted leadership in
biotechnology as a national goal (Office of Technology Assessment, 1991).
BACKGROUND
Following Kogut (1991), we characterize R&D equity collaborations as a two-stage
compound option; whereby investing firms holding a limited equity stake in a target firm can
track knowledge development and (market and technological) opportunities in industries. Such
equity collaborations allow firms to maintain strategic flexibility to respond to industry trends
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that are difficult to predict. Following the initial equity investment, exercise of the first stage of
the option is represented by the full acquisition of a target partner. In the case of R&D
partnerships where an investing firm has taken a minority equity stake, partner buyout refers to
the acquisition of the R&D supplier/partner. Partner buyout for joint ventures refers to the
acquisition of the joint venture by one of the parents.2 Exercise of the second stage growth
option is represented by making further discretionary investments in research or commercial
opportunities resulting from the first stage commitment. In this view, equIty collaborations may
be initiated as a way to manage endogenous and exogenous uncertainty. Exogenous and
endogenous uncertainty have different effects on the decision to commit additional capital (Dixit
& Pindyck, 1994; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996).
Exogenous uncertainty cannot be reduced by the actions of the firm. In the case of emerging
technology industries, exogenous uncertainty exists when, for example, the technological
trajectory of the industry is indeterminate, industry infrastructure is lacking, and/or when key
legislation affecting the industry is pending. Given these conditions, the premature acquisition of
firms developing emerging technologies may impose considerable risks because the investing
firm gives up the option ofwaiting for new information that might affect the desirability or
timing of the investment. The ability to delay irreversible investment expenditures until
exogenous uncertainty is resolved can be an important source of flexibility in a project and
profoundly affect subsequent decisions to invest (McDonald & Siegel, 1986).
By contrast, endogenous uncertainty can be decreased by actions of the firm. Potential
sources of endogenous uncertainty for the investing firm include: expansion into unfamiliar
international markets, integration of firms from diverse cultures, initiation of R&D projects that
take time to develop, or inability to assess the target firm's knowledge. This form of uncertainty
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is primarily resolved by learning; that is, actually performing the activities associated with a
given project. Previous research suggests that greater endogenous uncertainty increases the value
of information, and thus, increases incentives to invest in knowledge generation or acquisition
(McCardle, 1985). In the presence of endogenous uncertainty, the key characteristic that makes
the investment in knowledge so attractive is the ability to temporarily or permanently suspend
further equity investment if the expected value of the completed projects declines due to
exogenous shocks. Roberts and Weitzman (1981) have shown that if learning is enhanced by
moving to the next stage of the project, there is an incentive to speed up the rate of conunitment.
We argue that it is the combination of endogenous uncertainty and enhanced learning by
moving to the next stage that motivates the decision to conunit incrementally. This staged
investment approach takes on value when internalizing the partner increases the rate of learning
about the project. In this sense, exercising the buyout of a partner is comparable to the exercise
of a call option on equities that pay dividends. In the presence of dividends (that come in th<;
form of learning advantages) there may be an incentive to exercise the partner buyout option
early. If the target turns out to have skills that are relevant for the partner but cannot be easily
transferred across firm boundaries after a brief interchange, a buyout may be the only viable
alternatives. Relative to arm's-length contracts, internalization facilitates transfer of
technological capabilities because the acquirer can tap into its repository of social knowledge that
structures cooperative action. According to Kogut and Zander (1992), this difference in the
marginal efficiency of technology transfer constitutes the ownership advantage of the firm. 3
Internalizing the partner firm may increase the efficiency of knowledge transfer, thus enabling
the firm to reduce future R&D costs so that growth opportunities can be exercised at a lower
cost.
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In sum, there are at least three important factors which need consideration when examining
determinants of partner buyouts: (1) the level of exogenous uncertainty, (2) the level of
endogenous uncertainty, and (3) the relative rate of learning inside versus outside firm
boundaries. Unless endogenous uncertainty (2) is present, the relative rate of learning inside
versus outside the firm (3) will have no consequence. This implies an interaction effect. In this
paper, we focus explicitly on the expected interaction between endogenous uncertainty and
learning. In the presence of endogenous uncertainty firms will invest sequentially when such
commitment yields information about future opportunities. Firms that learn more efficiently in
hierarchies are candidates to buyout their partners.
In the next section we describe our main thesis: that national culture traits and cultural
differences between partners should contribute to endogenous uncertainty and rates of learning in
hierarchy, and therefore, should bear upon the buyout decision.
HYPOTHESES
When valuable, but unexplored technology is resident in a target firm, investing firms differ
in terms of how learning activities are to be organized. Consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1991; Olie, 1994; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Powell, Koput & Smith-
Doerr, 1996), we argue that the cultural attributes of among investing firms are principal
determinants of how firms choose to organize learning activities. We motivate our hypotheses
using two of Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of national culture: power distance and uncertainty
avoidance. We believe that these two dimensions are the most relevant in the study of partner
buyouts for several reasons. First, as noted by Hofstede, "Of the four dimensions of national
culture, power distance and uncertainty avoidance in particular affect our thinking about
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organizations. Organizing always demand the answering of two questions: (1) Who has the
power to deCide what? And (2) What rules or procedures will be followed to attain the desired
ends?" (1991: 140).4 In contrast, Hofstede believes that while his other two dimensions,
masculinity and individualism, broadly reflect the values of the national culture, they imply little
about administrative practices within organizations. Consistent with the importance placed on
power distance and uncertainty avoidance inside organizations, these two dimensions have been
the most pervasive in research examining the behaviors of multinational corporation as
evidenced by the work of Erramilli (1996), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Kogut and Singh
(1988), and Shane (1993). Finally, Hofstede (1991) argues that various combinations of power
distance and uncertainty avoidance correspond directly to each of Mintzberg's (1983) preferred
authority configurations and coordinating mechanisms, thereby capturing both national and
organizational traits. It seems that power distance and uncertainty avoidance are the most
distinctive cultural dimensions which influence organizational structure and functioning
(Hoecklin, 1995).
We argue that power distance of a national culture will influence the degree to which the
investing firm can learn in hierarchy. Also, uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance are
argued to contribute to endogenous uncertainty in the equity partner relationship.5
Power Distance and Learning Inside versus Outside the Firm
As noted, Kogut and Zander (1992) point to the important differences in learning efficiency
across governance modes. They argue that it is more efficient to transfer complex knowledge
within the boundaries of a firm because learning processes are a function of shared values and
assumptions. If national culture embodies social knowledge and organizing principles, it
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therefore bears upon the expected efficiency of learning subsequent to partner buyout. Firms
from certain cultures may learn more efficiently when internalized, while the marginal rate of
learning in hierarchy may be lower for firms from other cultures. Hall (1976) argued that
cultures vary greatly in the processing of information and patterns of communication.
One cultural attribute that should influence the rate of learning in hierarchies relative to
collaborations is power distance (PD). Power Distance is defined as "the extent to which
members of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally"
(Hofstede, 1985: 348-349). As applied to organizations, control, decision making, and authority
are likely to be highly centralized (Hofstede, 1980). Acquiring finns from cultures characterized
as high PD operate most comfortably in hierarchy. In such countries, we expect the marginal rate
of learning or technology transfer to be highest in hierarchy. Indeed, Hofstede (1991) discusses
the implications of culture in an important learning context - in schools. In high PD cultures,
such as Japan, learning is structured and hierarchical. By contrast, learning is loose and more
unstructured in low PD cultures.
One might expect that firms from high PD cultures will move directly to outright
acquisition, and avoid the first stage equity collaboration. Consistent with this expectation,
Shane (1993) found that the higher the PD, the greater the likelihood of hierarchical control in
transactions. More recently, Erramilli (1996) found that firms from countries with higher PD are
more likely to seek majority ownership in foreign subsidiaries.
In the absence of endogenous uncertainty, firms from high PD cultures will acquire outright.
However, in the presence of endogenous uncertainty, they will invest incrementally, beginning
with the first stage equity collaboration. Several cultural attributes influence endogenous
uncertainty.
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Uncertainty Avoidance, Cultural Distance, and Endogenous Uncertainty
The study of national culture on governance modes has predominantly focused on
transaction cost explanations, where the cultural attributes or partner differences in national
culture are expected to moderate the ability of managers to perceive the potential for
opportunistic behavior by partners (Harrigan, 1985). As noted earlier, these transaction costs
were found to be a key determinant for dissolution of equity partnerships and joint ventures and
have been carefully articulated in the literature. Building on previous research, we argue that
uncertainty avoidance (UA) and cultural distance (CD) are two important contributors to
endogenous uncertainty.
Uncertainty avoidance (UA) is defined as the "degree to which the members of a society feel
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, which leads them to support beliefs promising
certainty and to maintain institutions protecting conformity" (Hofstede, 1985: 348-349). In an
organizational context, having high levels of UA leads managers to make less risky decisions and
develop coping mechanisms to control uncertainty, such as developing complex systems of rules
and regulations and following structured, ritual behavior (Hofstede, 1980).
Uncertainty avoidance was shown to be an important predictor of foreign market entry
modes. For instance, Kogut and Singh (1988) found that multinational corporations from
cultures high in UA are more likely to choose joint ventures or greenfield entry modes over full
acquisitions. These authors attribute this result to the fact that the uncertainty associated with
integrating the management teams of both subsidiary and parent firms is untenable. Therefore,
these firms are more comfortable with either a greenfield investment or establishing an equity
partnership with the host county target. Shane (1993) found that firms from high UA societies
favor licensing over acquisition-type entry modes.
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Given their proclivity toward risk avoidance, it is not surprising that finns from high UA
cultures prefer staged investment to outright commitment. At the same time, we expect finns
from high UA cultures to benefit from a transition toward hierarchy because of the added
structure in place to control opportunistic behavior. When finns are from cultures that are also
high in power distance, we expect there is added incentive to internalize the target finn in order
to learn about growth opportunities more efficiently. Our proposition that high PD, high UA
cultures are quicker to internalize appears consistent with arguments made by Hurry et al. (1992)
and Chang (1995), who asserted that Japanese finns, relative to U.S. finns, were more likely to
eventually acquire target firms. By contrast, U.S. finns are more likely to sell their equity
positions in target finns following the target firm's initial public offering. Indeed, according to
Hofstede (1980), the Japanese are ranked significantly higher on both PD and UA compared to
the United States.
Hypothesis 1: When established finns are from cultures ranked high in uncertainty
avoidance and high in power distance, partner buyouts are more likely.
In the passage above, we argued that established finns from cultures with higher power
distance learn more efficiently from their partners, and that the marginal incentive to acquire
their partners is highest when the relationship is confronted with endogenous uncertainty. While
uncertainty avoidance is one dimension that accentuates endogenous uncertainty, cultural
distance (CD) between the partners may also influence the amount of endogenous uncertainty.
Cultural distance is defined as the degree to which the home country culture of an investing firm
is dissimilar from that of the host country market and finns operating therein. When there is
more cultural distance between partners, the ability to effectively observe and predict
opportunism among partners is hindered (Kogut, 1988), leading to higher potential transaction
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costs. Here, transaction costs represent communication and control costs embodied in cultural
differences.
A large body of work has focused on initial governance choice and found cultural
differences lead finns to shy away from hierarchy (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Gatignon and
Anderson, 1988; Shane 1993). Other researchers have attended to the role of cultural distance on
the stability of existing partnerships, finding that it contributes to a higher rate of partnership
dissolution (Harrigan, 1985; Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Barkema,-Shenkar, Venneulen,
& Bell, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997). More relevant to our study, Olie (1994) and Elsass and
Veiga (1994) argued that the blending of diverse cultures tends to be a challenging obstacle to
successful mergers. Indeed, cultural differences between finns was found to predict stress,
negative attitudes toward merger, and the lack of cooperation between finns subsequent to
merger (Weber, Shenkar, & Raveh, 1996).
These findings suggest that for existing partnerships, cultural differences raise the degree of
endogenous uncertainty facing partnerships, and the endogenous uncertainty facing prospects for
successful mergers of the finns. The successful transfer of knowledge among culturally distant
partners is an indeterminate process. This view is captured clearly by Luostarinen, who defined
cultural distance as "the sum of factors creating, on the one hand, a need for knowledge, and on
the other hand, barriers to the knowledge flow and hence also for flows between the home and
the target countries" (1980: 131-132).
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we argue that when endogenous uncertainty is combined with
more efficient leaming in hierarchy (i.e, high PD), partner buyouts should ensue. As a result,
when partners are culturally distant and the investing firm is from a culture that is high in power
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distance, we expect there to be added incentive to internalize the target firm in order to learn
about growth opportunities more efficiently.
Hypothesis 2: When partners are more culturally distant and the established firm is ranked
high in power distance, partner buyouts are more likely.
REsEARCH DESIGN
Sample
We drew a sample of minority equity collaborations and joint ventures involving dedicated
biotechnology firms (DBFs) from the North Carolina Biotechnology Center (NCBC) Actions
Database. This database includes detailed information regarding over 4,000 relationships and
transactions among firms in the biotechnology industry since 1978. In particular, the NCBC
database includes the following transaction characteristics: a) whether the transaction involved an
exchange of equity via a minority investment or a joint venture, b) the transaction date, c) the
identity and number of partners involved, d) the type of partners involved (i.e., DBF, established
firm, government, or university), e) each party's home country, f) the technological subfield, and
g) a general description of each transaction. All transactions were cross-validated with a similar
database, Bioscan. In the event that the transaction dates differed across sources, we used the
earlier of the two dates.
In studying the NCBC Actions database and comparing with Bioscan we collected
information on 618 equity collaborations. This original sample was reduced for three theoretical
reasons. First, our compiled data were restricted to transactions involving only two parties, a
target DBF domiciled in the United States and established firms having core businesses outside
of biotechnology. We believe it is easier to identify the integrated manufacturer as the holder of
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the call option to acquire, a belief consistent with Hurry et al. (1992). This is particularly
reasonable in cases where established fIrms take a minority equity stake in a DBF. These cases
constitute 83.8 percent of our fInal sample. Determining who holds the call option is more
challenging in joint ventures, where both parties contribute capital and knowledge to a jointly
owned and controlled entity.6 We control for likelihood that joint ventures may be bought out by
the DBF by including a joint venture dummy variable and by modeling joint venture buyouts by
the DBF fIrm as a competing event.
Second, we restricted our sample to include only four broad subfIelds: a) therapeutics, b)
diagnostics, c) agriculture (aglbio), and d) supplier/specialty chemical. These subfields account
for a large majority of all firms dedicated to biotechnology (Dibner, 1992). This focus on the
largest subfields was necessary because of our need to have a critical mass of public fIrms to
generate stock market indices for each subfield for our measure of exogenous uncertainty.
Finally, we focus on equity collaborations with DBFs domiciled in the United States. This
enabled us to better control for exogenous events specific to country boundaries. Given these
constraints on our database we identified 248 equity collaborations initiated between 1978 and
1995. Of these, we were unable to obtain the precise starting dates of 30 transactions, despite
supplementing our search using LexislNexus and SEC Schedule 13D mings.
We made considerable effort to verify the outcome of each partnership. If the December
1995 issue of Bioscan listed the equity partnership as ongoing, the transaction was coded as
right-censored. Otherwise, a systematic search was undertaken to understand the nature of the
transaction termination. NCBC and Bioscan data were supplemented with a search of Ernst &
Young Biotechnology Industry Reports, Predicast' s F&S Index of Corporate Change,
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LexislNexis, and SEC Schedule 13D filings. From this effort we were able to verify the timing
and outcome of 173 equity partnerships constituting our final sample.
Of the 173 transactions in our final sample, 23 were terminated by partner buyout by
established firms, 39 were dissolved, 21 were terminated by other means (6 joint ventures were
acquired by the DBF partner, 5 joint ventures were acquired by third parties, 10 DBFs were
acquired by a third party), and 90 were right censored; that is, they were still in effect at the end
of 1995.7 Table 1 provides a breakdown ofthe number of established f~s from each country
that have initiated equity collaborations with U.S. biotechnology finns. Here, we also list the
outcome of these equity collaborations for each country. While equity investments are most
prominently undertaken by firms in a few countries, there seems to be a clear difference in the
outcomes of these collaborations. U.S finns have a high percentage of partnership dissolutions
and third-party buyouts. Japanese finns and those from the United Kingdom have a significant
proportion of partnerships maintained, as do finns from Switzerland, Gennany, and Sweden.
While these trends show clear differences in country propensities regarding equity collaboration
outcomes, it is unclear whether these patterns are statistically robust when controlling for cultural
factors, finn-specific factors, and those relating to the value and exogenous uncertainty regarding
the technology. Furthennore, Table 1 does not consider the timing of the outcome event. For
example, while it is clear that a greater percentage of Japanese firms maintained their equity
stake than do U.S. finns, it does not help us understand whether Japanese finns maintained their
equity relationships longer than U.S. finns.
Insert Table 1 about here
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Model and Method
We selected a competing-risk, discrete-time event history analysis to test our hypotheses.
Event history models are especially appropriate for analyzing longitudinal data when the
dependent variable is a discrete event and the timing of the event's occurrence is of particular
interest. Competing risk is a special form of event history analysis that is used when the
dependent variable has two or more outcomes and the occurrence of anyone outcome removes
the subject from the risk of the other outcome(s). Buyouts are one of several ways in which a
partnership may be terminated. Other forms of termination include (a) dissolution of the
partnership, (b) acquisition of a biotechnology firm or joint venture by a third party, and (c)
acquisition of a joint venture by the biotechnology partner (rather than acquisition by the
established firm). Although we do not develop explicit hypotheses regarding these other forms
of termination, they do represent relevant "competing hazards" in that they preclude subsequent
occurrences of partner buyouts. To model the competing hazards, the hazard rate function is
defined as
(1) h/t} = limP/t,t + s)/s
S40
where h(t) is the hazard function associated with either partner buyout (j=1), partnership
dissolution (j=2); or other termination (j=3). Plt,t+s) is the probability that event type j occurs in
the interval between t and t+s, given that the partnership is at risk at time t.
Cox's (1975) partial likelihood method for parameter estimation allows us to incorporate
time dependence into the model, without specifying its form. The general form for the Cox
proportional hazards models estimated in this study is:
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where altJ may be any function of time, X(t) and Yare vectors of time dependent and time
invariant explanatory variables, and Pj and A, are vectors of estimable parameters. We used TDA
version 5.7 to simultaneously estimate the competing hazards model (Rohwer, 1994) with Cox's
partial likelihood method. We do not provide estimates for the baseline hazard function, alt),
since partial likelihood estimation discards this function. 8
The three events - buyout, dissolution, and other termination - were updated monthly. The
sample includes 9,843 monthly periods. The cultural variables were not time varying, but many
control variables were updated monthly.
Culture Variables
Hypothesis 1 is tested by multiplying Hofstede's (1980) well-known measures of
uncertainty avoidance and power distance to each country in our sample. Hypothesis 2 also
suggests a multiplicative function involving power distance and cultural distance. Our test
considers two alternative measures of cultural distance. First, following Kogut and Singh (1988),
we measured Hofstede's cultural distance (HCD) as a composite index based on the each of the
four cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980).
We also used a second measure of cultural distance is generated from a study by Ronen and
Shenkar (1985), who synthesized country clusters into nine groupings of countries with similar
work-related attitudes and values. The "Anglo" cluster involves Australia, Canada, Ireland, New
Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. All other countries in the study were
grouped into the other eight clusters. Using this data, we constructed a measure of cultural
distance such that when the established firm fell in the Anglo cluster, Ronen '8 cultural distance
(RSCD) was coded "0", otherwise it was coded"1".
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Control Variables
Clearly, cultural factors may not dominate partner buyout decisions. We argued earlier that
exogenous forces partially dictate how uncertain future payoffs are and whether a buyout option
is in-the-money. Other forces specific to the industry, the investing firm, and partner
relationship may also bear upon the buyout decision. In this section, we describe our attempts to
control for the factors found to be important by previous researchers.
Kogut (1991) argued that exogenous forces determine whether a buyout option is in-the-
money. He argued that when industry sales deviated positively from industry forecasts, joint
venture partners would seek to acquire the joint venture. His annual measures, shipment growth
and deviation from expected growth, are meant to capture the certainty to which joint ventures
operating in an industry have appreciated in value. Our measures of exogenous variables are in
the same spirit, but are measured differently. Whereas Kogut's study spanned several industries
and uses annual measures, ours concentrates only on biotechnology, and we consequently focus
on measuring exogenous forces within technological subfields on a monthly basis. Sales
measures are unreasonable in this industry because most firms have no revenues from sales. Like
Folta (1998), we measure subfield value and subfield (exogenous) uncertainty using stock market
indices generated from publicly traded firm in concentrating in particular biotechnology
subfields. These measures were constructed from stock prices that were gathered from the
Center for Research in Security Prices data base, and are described briefly below, but in more
detail in Folta (1998).
Differences in the expected value of growth opportunities across the four subfields
(Therapeutic, Diagnostic, AglBio, and Supplier I Specialty Chemical) with four stock indices that
were created from weekly returns of nine U.S. biotechnology finns specializing in the respective
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subfields. The subfield value of firm j was measured as the value of the monthly biotechnology
index for subfield m (whenj Em). These indices are weighted equally. Weekly values of the
indices were then averaged within each month to get monthly index values for each of the four
subfields. Subfield value was transformed by taking its natural logarithm to correct for positive
skewness.
Exogenous uncertainty was measured as the 26-week standard deviation of the log of
weekly returns for each of the four biotechnology subfield indices. The 26-week measure was
chosen because it provides enough history to produce a reliable measure of volatility, without
assuming constant variance over a longer period of time. Exogenous uncertainty was converted
to a monthly measure by averaging the weekly standard deviations within any given month.
Substantial literature has confirmed the importance of industry structure on the choice of
governance mode.9 We use average subfield R&D expenditures divided by average total
expenses to control for such effects. Conventionally, the relationship of R&D expense is said to
encourage integrative modes, such as acquisition, in order to provide adequate administrative
control for coping with higher degrees of human and dedicated capital specific to a transaction.
Using this logic, we might expect a positive relationship between R&D expense and partner
buyout.
Park and Ungson (1997) did not control for exogenous forces, but did find that a series of
dummy variables related to the partnership influenced the buyout decision. They found that
partners with the same SIC code were less likely to acquire their partners, partners having a prior
relationship were more likely to end in acquisition, partnerships involving technology transfer
were less likely to end in acquisition, and partnerships involving multiple products were more
likely to end in acquisition. We test for some of these same effects, but not all. By definition,
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our sample includes partners from different SIC codes and partnerships involving technology
transfer.
Park and Ungson (1997) have highlighted the important moderating role that prior
relationships have on the effect of cultural differences on partnership dissolution. While they did
not test for whether this same effect holds for partner buyouts, it may be reasonable to expect
prior relationships to moderate either the degree of endogenous uncertainty or the relative rate of
learning in collaboration versus hierarchy. We did not include prior relationships in our formal
presentation because to the extent that cultural dimensions influence the choice of prior
relationships with the partner, including a measure of prior transactions in the model would
confound our ability to interpret the results. In runs not reported, we did, include a dummy
measure for prior relationships, consistent with the measure employed by Park and Ungson, but
found no significant relationship in any of our models. Surprisingly, only 7.0 percent of the
partnerships had a prior relationship, a number significantly below Park and Ungson's 26.0
percent in the electronics industry. Apparently, it is more common to initiate a relationship with
equity transactions in the biotechnology industry.
Target firms having more commercial partners may not be attractive buyout candidates
because commercial opportunities to exploit their technology may be siphoned off by others. To
approximate the declining marginal threat of preemptive bidding or acquisition by each
additional partner, we used the natural logarithm of the target finn's number of current
commercial alliances. The number ofpartners was taken during the year of the event. In the
event of right-censored cases, the measure was taken in the last year of the observation window.
Bioscan provided this infonnation.
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If the transaction was ajoint venture an indicator variable was classified as a "1", and "0" if
it was a minority equity investment. Joint ventures are thought to provide a real option that is
more proprietary than is the case for minority investments.
Insert Table 2 about here
RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. Because of concerns
of multicollinearity between Uncertainty Avoidance and the Cultural Distance variables, as well
as the small number of events, we opted to present three full models relating to our hypotheses.
Table 3 presents the full (columns 2, 4, 6) and reduced (columns 1,3,5) models with the
parameter estimates for the hazard of partner buyout. To ascertain the degree of model fit,
likelihood ratio tests were performed on the incremental and full models. Each test produced a
chi-square statistic well above the critical value (p < 0.001), indicating that the overall fit is good.
The hypotheses for the individual interaction coefficients are tested under one-tail t-tests. In each
of the full models, the hypothesized interaction is positive and significant. These findings are
consistent with our expectations.
Insert Table 3 about here
In model 2, the positive coefficient on the interaction (p < 0.05) between Uncertainty
Avoidance and Power Distance is consistent with the expectations offered in hypothesis 1. It
suggests that established firms from cultures higher in UA and PD should be more likely to buy
out their partners.
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In models 4 and 6, both the positive coefficient on the interaction (p < 0.10) between
Hofstede's Cultural Distance and Power Distance as well as the positive coefficient on the
interaction (p < 0.01) between Ronen's Cultural Distance and Power Distance are consistent with
the expectations offered in hypothesis 2. It suggests that when partners that are more culturally
distant and established investors are higher in Power Distance there is an increased likelihood of
partner buyout.
Since the remaining variables in the models have no hypotheses related to them, we use a
two-tailed test to assess the significance of relationships. The only variable that demonstrated a
significant effect was Target Firm's Number of Partners. As was expected, it was negatively
related to the likelihood of partner buyout. This variable should approximate how proprietary the
buyout option is. The more partners a target partner has, the less proprietary is the option. The
variables relating to exogenous uncertainty, subfield value, and subfield R&D expense were not
significant. Neither was the indicator variable distinguishing joint ventures from minority
investments.
Table 3 also includes the competing hazard results for partnership dissolution in columns 7-
10. These results indicate that Uncertainty Avoidance and Ronen's Cultural Distance is
negatively related to the likelihood of dissolution. The latter result is consistent with those found
by Park and Ungson (1997) in studying the electronics industry. They did not examine the effect
of Uncertainty Avoidance. Furthermore, in comparison with the findings for the partner
acquisition models, these findings demonstrate that national culture attributes influence partner
dissolution differently. 10
Consistent with previous studies, we focused mainly on aggregate measures of cultural
distance. However, Hofstede (1980) suggests that partner differences for power distance,
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uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and individuality may represent important areas of conflict
among partners. In addition, recent research suggests that absolute measures of cultural
"distance" may obfuscate directional differences among individual cultural attributes (O'Grady &
Lane, 1996). As a result, we also tested measures of cultural distance that are specific to
individual attributes. These variables are calculated the same way as illustrated in equation 3,
however, they only apply to a single attribute.
Insert Table 4 about here
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for cultural distance measures that are specific to
Hofstede's individual attributes of national culture. II We provide only the full models including
the interaction. In modell, the positive coefficient for the interaction between Power Distance
and Cultural DistancelPartner Differences in Power Distance is consistent with hypothesis 2.
Also consistent with Hypothesis 2 is the positive coefficient for the interaction between Power
Distance and Cultural DistancelPartner Differences in Uncertainty Avoidance. The interactions
in models 3 and 4 involving differences in Individuality and Masculinity, respectively, were not
significant. These findings support our a priori expectation focus on Uncertainty Avoidance and
Power Distance, and also support the arguments by Hofstede that these two dimensions of
national culture have the greatest bearing on organizational phenomena.
Given that partner differences in Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance seem to be the
two dimensions of national culture which best explain organizational phenomenon, we created a
cultural difference measure incorporating both of those dimensions. The model is illustrated in
column 5 of Table 4. The positive and significant interaction (p < 0.05) is consistent with
expectations for hypothesis 2.
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DISCUSSION
The role of national culture on governance choice has been frequently studied. However,
these studies have largely focused on the initial governance decision or partnership tenrunation,
giving little attention specifically to partner buyouts. This oversight is consequential, given the
high incidence of acquisition of joint venture and equity partners. By explicitly considering the
role of national culture on partner buyouts, we extend a growing body of literature that examines
the incremental nature of investments in joint ventures and partner firms in knowledge-intensive
industries. Although we are the not the first to characterize equity collaborations are compound
options, our study is the first to attempt to theoretically explain the role of national culture on
partner buyout. Partner buyout represents the exercise of the first stage option, while future
discretionary investments represent the exercise of the second stage option. Real option theory
suggests that firms should choose to invest incrementally in the face of endogenous uncertainty.
It also suggests that firms will be more likely to commit to the next stage when they can learn
more by committing, thereby reducing endogenous uncertainty.
We have built upon option theory to suggest that partner buyouts will be influenced by three
factors: exogenous variables, endogenous uncertainty, and the rate of learning inside versus
outside the firm. Our central argument is that attributes of national culture bears upon these
latter two factors. Specifically, we argue that both uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance
increases endogenous uncertainty. This is likely due to the inability to perceive the potential for
opportunistic behavior by partners, or information asymmetry between partners. As a result of
such uncertainty, established firms will shy away from aggressive commitment to growth
opportunities, they will invest incrementally. Firms from cultures that are high in power distance
are expected to transition to hierarchical governance because it is in hierarchies that they operate
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and learn most efficiently about growth opportunities. Thus, it is the combination of high
endogenous uncertainty and the ability (or prospects) to learn more efficiently after internalizing
the partner that leads to partner buyout.
Our empirical findings are consistent with the expectations noted above. Uncertainty
avoidance and cultural distance are argued to contribute to endogenous uncertainty, while power
distance is argued to impact the relative rate of learning in hierarchy relative to collaborations.
Established firms from high UA home country cultures are more likely to buyout partners when
they are also high in PD. Partners that are culturally distant are more likely to buyout partners
when they are also high in PD. These fmdings suggest that it is the combination of endogenous
uncertainty and efficient learning at the next stage that promote commitment via partner buyout.
They are robust to different measures of cultural distance emanating from work by Hofstede
(1980) and Ronen and Shenkar (1985). Distance measures using Hofstede's dimensions of
Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance seem to mostly explain endogenous uncertainty.
Upon examination of country values for UA, Japan is among the world's most uncertainty
avoidant cultures (about 1.5 standard deviations above the mean; see Hofstede, 1980: 315).
According to our research findings, Japanese firms might be expected to exhibit high levels of
anxiety with respect to both endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty. Therefore,
Japanese firms will place greater intrinsic and extrinsic value on maintaining the equity
collaboration. Indeed, our findings suggest that firms high in UA (including those from Japan)
are less likely to acquire their collaboration partners and less likely to dissolve the partnership.
These findings support those of Hurry et al. (1992) and Chang (1995) who found that Japanese
firms were more likely than U.S. firms to retain their holdings in international joint ventures.
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A Framework for Understanding Intentions of Foreign Partners
Using Hofstede's dimensions of Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance there is
potential to create a broad framework by which future studies can examine partner buyout
decisions in particular, and sequential investment more generally. In Table 5 we located
countries based on only two measures: Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance. Since these
measures are specific to the established firm, and not the relationship between partners, we can
develop a general framework of tendencies toward partner buyout. Since firms domiciled in
France and Japan are high in both Uncertainty Avoida.nce and Power Distance, we expect them to
be most likely to buyout their partners. The second most likely group to buyout partners
consists of firms high in Uncertainty Avoidance and medium in Power Distance: Germany, Italy,
and Switzerland. Finally, firms from countries that are medium in Qoth PD and UA (Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States) may also demonstrate a notion for partner
buyouts, although to a lesser extent. Established firms from other countries are less likely to
exhibit a tendency to buyout their partners either because there is low power distance or low
uncertainty avoidance.
Insert Table 5 about here
Of course, cultural distance is not depicted in Table 5. According to our theoretical
expectations, even established firms from uncertainty avoidance cultures may display a tendency
to buyout partners if they are culturally distant. The expectations presented in Table 5 can be
altered to reflect cultural distance. For example, France and Japan are especially likely
candidates for buyouts of U.S. partners because they are high on all three cultural attributes:
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Cultural Distance. The framework can be extended
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to partnerships not involving United States target firms. For example, the tendency for Japanese
firms to acquire Japanese partners may be muted somewhat because of a lack of cultural distance.
At the same time, because of high cultural distance, firms from Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States may demonstrate an increased tendency for acquiring Japanese
partners. We believe that these propositions are very deserving of more attention in samples
involving multiple industries and entry into multiple countries.
We should note several limitations of this study. Although our sampiing methodology was
comprehensive for nearly the entire life of the biotechnology industry, the number of partner
buyout events is small. Nevertheless, we managed to attain statistical significance for our key
variables and stability across a number of models containing firm-level and/or industry-level
control variables. A larger sample would allow disaggregation of joint ventures and minority
equity partnerships. Our study focused on a single industry, and sub-segments within that
industry. While these segments are distinct from one another, future research should attempt to
verify the expected relationships in other industries, including both R&D intensive and more
stable industries.
Parkhe (1991) suggests that formal training programs can enhance cultural understanding
and may moderate the relationship between cultural variables and the duration of global
alliances. These integrating mechanisms may have an important influence on the relative rate of
learning in joint ventures versus acquisition, and hence, may playa role in the buyout decision.
Unfortunately, since we lacked data on the extent of cross-cultural training programs, we could
not examine this issue. However, we believe that our theoretical framework offers an interesting
new opportunity to ascertain how integrating mechanisms may influence the relatively
unexplored phenomena of partner buyouts.
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Previous research has demonstrated that companies use collaborations when partnering with
culturally distant partners. Thus, our sample of equity collaborations may reflect some restricted
range of cultural distance. Indeed, means scores of cultural distance varied significantly when we
examined a broader sample of transactions involving both equity collaborations (0.64) and
outright acquisitions (.036). Thus, our study, and any study examining the effect of national
culture on partner buyout will suffer from such a bias. This will tend to weaken the results for
cultural distance. We have demonstrated, however, that even though we have sampled culturally
distant partners, power distance acts to moderate the partner buyout decision.
Overall, our study suggests that cultural attributes of the investing firm and cultural
differences between the investing and target firms playa significant role in predicting the rate at
which partner buyouts occur. It suggests that firms find value in flexibility in the presence of
endogenous uncertainty, and are quicker to exercise when buyout enhances the potential rate of
learning. The hypotheses developed here and the results we found offer some promising new
directions for future empirical research.
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ENDNOTES
1 Other evidence of partner buyouts include Kogut (1989), who found that 24.0 percent of
joint ventures were acquired by a partner within seven years, and Mikkelson and Ruback (1985),
who discovered that 13.6 percent of firms having initiated minority investments either acquired
or attempted to acquire their partner within three years of taking an initial equity stake.
2 We are not without precedent in defining the scope of this research to encompass both joint
ventures and minority investments (e.g., Hennart, 1991; Pisano, 1989).
3 For Williamson (1985), the ownership advantage of the firm results from its superior
mechanisms for coping with opportunism. .
4 Although Hofstede is largely famous for his 1980 IBM national culture study, he and his
colleagues later found several links between national culture and organizational culture
(Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990). In particular, the organizational
culture dimensions of need/or authority and need/or security correlated strongly with power
distance and uncertainty avoidance, respectively. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to only
power distance and uncertainty avoidance - cultural dimensions that capture both national and
organizational traits.
5 We are grateful to a reviewer who emphasized that cultural distance and uncertainty
avoidance are not equated to endogenous uncertainty. Indeed, they are merely constructs that
contribute to endogenous uncertainty. As pointed out on pages 6-7, endogenous uncertainty may
be represented by many factors.
6 Either partner may hold the option to acquire the joint venture. Who is most likely to
exercise the option in the case of joint ventures turns not only on the strategic intentions of the
partners, but the relative competitive strengths of the partners--the partner possessing unique
complementary resources being the more likely to acquire the weaker partner's stake (Hurry,
1993). Integrated firms investing in biotechnology have downstream skills in marketing and
distribution, and regulatory savvy (Arora & Gambardella, 1990). Although dedicated
biotechnology firms (DBFs) have important R&D capabilities, they frequently lack the cash
needed to invest in acquisitions. Furthermore, most integrated manufacturers of pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and agt'"iculture have a major goal of acquiring technical knowledge in biotechnology,
while only a handful ofDBF's aspire to become fully integrated (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1991). In our sample we found that six joint ventures were acquired by the
integrated partner and six joint ventures that were acquired by the DBF. Our focus on the
established firm as the holder also rests on our theoretical interest in understanding when firms
are more likely to commit to internalizing technical knowledge to capitalize on emerging
technologies, and not downstream skills.
7 Although the rate of acquisition (6.9 percent) by year three appears somewhat below rates
found in studies noted on page 3, to make our rate comparable we must also include acquisitions
by the DBF partner and allow for a three year window for the event to take place. In making that
adjustment we find that 10.0 percent of the total sample (14.8 percent of joint ventures and 8.9
percent of minority investments) was terminated by acquisition by one of the partners within 36
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months. This, then, is consistent with previous studies.
8 The Cox method uses only information about the relative order of duration times, instead of
the exact timing of events. Hence, the Cox method involves some loss of information,
potentially inhibiting model estimation. This same feature makes the Cox model an attractive
one when one has no prior expectations about time dependence. Another reason to question the
validity of the Cox partial likelihood model for our data is that our number of events is relatively
few. Although partial likelihood models are asymptotically efficient when the sample size is
large (Efron, 1977), when the sample size is small, the precision of the partial likelihood
estimates can be much less than that for maximum likelihood estimates (Coleman, 1981). We
estimated a second model using maximum likelihood. Maximum likelihood methods require
specification of a baseline hazard function. We chose the exponential specification because it is
the parametric equivalent to the Cox method. The results from that estimation produced a
pattern of relations identical to those found via the Cox estimation, with slightly less
significance. This supplemental analysis provided evidence for the robustness of the results
reported in this paper.
9 We also examined the effect of industry structure using number of rivals active in each of
the 123 product areas for each year throughout the publication of Bioscan (1987-1995). We did
not include this variable in the formal presentation because it had no substantive impact on the
model, and there was substantial coIinearity with other variables in the model (R&D Expense and
Subfield Value).
10 We also examined whether dissolution was influenced by an interaction between cultural
distance and power distance, and uncertainty avoidance and power distance. Log likelihood ratio
tests indicated no such interaction existed.
II Weber, Shenkar, and Raveh (1996) also used distance measures for Hofstede's individual
culture attributes, but focused on the impact on mergers and acquisition, not partner buyouts.
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Table 1: Cultural Measures and Outcomes of Equity Collaborations by Country of Corporate Headquarters
Cultural Measures Outcomes of Equity Collaborations
Actual (Percent)
Country Hofstede's Ronen's Partner Partnership 3rd Party Partnerships Total # of
UA PD Cult. Cultural Buyout Dissolution Buyout Maintained Establish
Distance Category -ed Firms
Australia 51 36 0.026 Anglo 1 (100%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1 1
I
Canada 48 39 0.138 Anglo 0(0%) 1 (50% 1 (50%) 0(0%) 2 1
I Denmark 23 18 1.745 Nordic 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2 2
France 86 68 1.617 Latin Europe 2 (40%)
I o (0%) 0(0%) 3 (60%) 5 2
Germany 65 35 0.630 Germanic 0(0%) 0(0%) 2 (28.6%) 5 (71.4%) 7 2
Ireland 35 28 0.530 Anglo 1 (50%) I (50%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2 1
Italy 75 50 0.650 Latin Europe 1 (50.0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1 (50.0%) 2 2
Japan 92 54 3.104 Far East 3 (13.6%) 3 (13.6%) 1 (4.6%) 15 (68.2%) 22 17
Norway 50 31 1.667 Nordic 0(0%) I (100%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1 1
Sweden 29 31 1.859 Nordic 1 (12.5%) 2 (25.0%) 1 (12.5%) 4 (50.0%) 8 4
Switzerland 58 34 0.528 Germanic 3 (17.7%) 1 (5.8%) 3 (17.2%) 10 (58.8%) 17 3
United Kingdom 35 I 35 0.083 Anglo 0(0%) 1 (7.1 %) 0(0%) 13 (92.9%) 14 3
United States 46 40 0.000 Anglo 10(11.1%) 28 (31.1%) 13 (14.5%) 39 (43.3%) 90 34
Total 23 (13%) 39 (23%) 21 (12%) 90 (52%) 173 73
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix8
Mean S.D I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Uncertainty Avoidance 53.143 18.157
2. Hofstede's Cultural Distance 0.632 1.078 I 0.786 *
3. Ronen's Cultural Distance 0.343 0.475 0.653 * 0.795 *
4. Power Distance 40.804 8.141 0.823 * 0.572 * 0.268 *
5. UA*PD 2290.158 1283.659 0.964 * 0.794 * 0.573 * 0.918 *
6. Hofstede's CD * PD 30.817 57.567 0.869 * 0.977 * 0.728 * 0.711 * 0.893 *
7. Ronen's CD * PD 15.023 22.129 0.835 * 0.879 * 0.940 * 0.568 * 0.807 * 0.876 *
8. Exogenous Uncertainty 0.3191 0.103 -0.035 * -0.006 -0.004 -0.027 * -0.029 * -0.014 -0.013
9. Subfield Value 5.736 1.095 0.050 * 0.050 * 0.099 * 0.026 * 0.052 * 0.056 * 0.106 * 0.098 *
10. Subfield R&D Expense 41.423 11.846 0.135 * 0.188 * 0.201 * 0.052 * 0.133 * 0.186 * 0.205 * 0.107 * 0.328 *
11. Target's # of Partners 3.118 1.625 -0.030 * -0.177 * -0.040 * -0.128 * -0.112 * -0.173 * -0.086 * -0.003 -0.021 * -0.076 *
12. Joint Venture 0.170 0.375 0.067 * 0.035 * 0.072 * 0.053 * 0.058 * 0.039 * 0.073 * -0.035 * -0.109 * -0.084 * 0.164 *
* Pearson correlations are significant at p < 0.05.
a Correlations are calculated using pooled cross-sectional and time-series data covering 173 equity partnerships and 9,843 one-month periods.
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Table 3: Partial Likelihood Estimates for Hazard of Partner Buyout and Pa,rtnership Dissolution
Partnership Acquisition Partnership Dissolution
Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (0)
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.0278 -0.0338 -0.0179t
(0.0197l (0.0356) (0.0102)
Hofstede I s Cultural Distance 0.1899 -0.7904 -0.2919
(0.2100) (0.6699) (0.1823)
Ronen's Cultural Distance 0.6992 -2.7992* -0.8394*
(0.4355) (1.5773) (0.4066)
Power Distance -0.0660 -0.0996* -0.0262 -0.0510* -0.0215 -0.0902** -0.0315
(0.0420) (0.0392) (0.0246) (0.0254) (0.0210) (0.0306) (0.0195
UA*PD 0.0012*.
(0.0006)
Hofstede's CD * PD 0.0219t.
(0.0136)
Ronen's CD * PD 0.0903**.
(0.0388)
Exogenous Uncertainty -2.0209 -1.8379 -2.3513 -1.8959 -2.3481 -1.8051 2.6796t 3.1736 3.2658* 2.5622
(2.2834) (2.2631) (2.2945) (2.3054) (2.2896) (2.2970) (1.5885) (1.6273) (1.6409) (1.5882)
Subfield Value -0.0581 -0.0775 -0.0612 -0.0666) -0.0736 -0.1045 0.1934 0.2007 0.2183 0.2045
(0.1951) (0.2020) (0.1962) (0.1976) (0.1954) (0.1988) (0.1637) (0.1631) (0.1638) (0.1634)
Subfield R&D Expense -0.0131 -0.0217 -0.0143 -0.0175 -0.0154 -0.0220 0.0148 0.0140 0.0151 0.0124
(0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0162)
Target Firm's # of Partners -0.4819** -0.3797* -0.4524** -0.4213** -0.4567** -0.3884* -0.4584*** -0.4982*** -0.4851 *** -0.4775***
(0.1627) (0.1678) (0.1659) (0.1632) (0.1637) (0.1622) (0..1291) (0.1303) (0.1310) (0.1289)
Joint Venture 0.6862 0.6543 0.6032 0.6359 0.6449 0.6671 0.1343 0.0792 0.0966 0.1550
(0.5065) (0.5057) (0.5020) (0.5008) (0.4986) (0.4954) (0.4955) (0.4911) (0.4917) (0.4976)
Log-likelihood Ratio -326.70*** -324.72*** -326.98*** -325.86*** -325.14*** -322.93*** 327.52*** 328.21*** 327.20*** 328.52***
a Standard error in parentheses
t p<O.IO; * p<0.05; ** p<O.OI; *** p<O.OOI
• One-tailed t-test for hypothesized relations
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Table 4: Partial Likelihood Estimates for Hazard of Partner Buyout
Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cultural Distance - Partner -0.4271
Differences in PD (0.6234t
Cultural Distance - Partner -1.3022
Differences in UA (0.7499)
Cultural Distance - Partner -0.1099
Differences in Individuality (0.8065)
Cultural Distance - Partner -0.5841
Differences in Masculinity (0.5007)
Cultural Distance - Partner -0.4084
Differences in (PD + VA) (0.3592)
Power Distance -0.0594 -0.0531 * -0.0323 -0.0404 -0.0647 *
(0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0305) (0.0263) (0.0269)
Differences in PD * PD 0.0201 *.
(0.0116)
Differences in UA * PD 0.0295 *.
(0.0137)
Differences in Individuality * PD 0.0042.
(0.0157)
Differences in Masculinity * PD 0.0183 •
(0.0145)
Differences in (PD + UA) * PD 0.0127 *.
(0.0064)
Exogenous Uncertainty -1.9168 -1.6697 -2.2012 -2.0129 -1.7917
(2.2621) (2.2915) (2.2884) (2.3173) (2.2811)
Subfield Value -0.1443 -0.0984 -0.0560 -0.0664) -0.1110
(0.2066) (0.2014) (0.1964) (0.1960) (0.2019)
Subfield R&D Expense -0.0195 -0.0204 -0.0140 -0.0143 -0.0212
(0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0175)
Target Finn's # of Partners -0.3839 * -0.3882 * -0.4597 ** -0.4460 ** -0.3734 *
(0.1659) (0.1635) (0.1659) (0.1641) (0.1652)
Joint Venture 0.5012 0.5850 0.6206 0.6045 0.5825
(0.5013) (0.5028) (0.5059) (0.5009) (0.4993)
Log-likelihood Ratio -323.94 *** -324.71 *** -327.43 *** -326.88 *** -324.14 ***
a Standard error in parentheses
t p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
• One-tailed t-test for hypothesized relations
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THE EFFECT OF NATIONAL CULTURE ON PARTNER BUYOUTS IN CROSS-BORDER
BIOTECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES
ABSTRACT
This study examines how national culture influences the likelihood and rate of buyouts
among R&D equity alliances and joint ventures in the biotechnology industry. We hypothesize
that the interaction of specific national culture attributes and cultural differences between alliance
partners bear upon: a) the amount of endogenous uncertainty surrounding the potential
integration of the target firm and b) the marginal rate of learning in hierarchical versus
collaborative governance. Applying a competing hazard model to a sample of 173 joint ventures
and minority equity collaborations in the biotechnology industry, we found that investing firms
from high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance countries are more likely to buyout
their alliance partners. Furthermore, greater cultural distance between alliance partners increases
the likelihood of partner buyout when investing firms are from high power distance countries.
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As knowledge-intensive industries become increasingly global, high tech firms are
confronted with the strategic challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with cross-border
alliances. Indeed, considerable managerial and scholarly attention has been paid to not only the
benefits of such alliances, but also on the transactional difficulties wrought by alliance partners
from different national cultures. However, most of these efforts have focused on the choice of
initial governance mode (e.g., Erramilli, 1996; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Shane, 1993). The present
study is motivated in three respects. First, it is becoming clear that governance decisions may
involve a strategy to sequentially invest equity in an alliance partner over time (Chang, 1995;
Penner-Hahn, 1998). Second, partnerships often terminate with acquisition (Folta, 1998; Hurry,
Kogut, 1991; Miller & Bowman, 1992) as opposed to other forms of termination, such as
dissolution or third party buyouts. Third, little research to date has explicitly examined whether
national culture characteristics influence patterns of sequential investment and the particular
mode of alliance termination.
This paper is an attempt to fill the gaps noted above by examining the role of national
culture on the likelihood and rate of buyouts among R&D equity alliances and joint ventures in
the biotechnology industry. Partner buyouts are a relatively common occurrence in other
knowledge-intensive industries. For example, Park and Russo (1996) found that 16.2 percent of
joint ventures in the electronics industry were acquired within three years of founding, while
Choi (1991) has found that 13.6 percent of minority investments ended in acquisition within one
year of initiation. I Yet, despite their frequency, very few studies have explicitly treated partner
buyouts as a distinct form of partnership termination. This is unfortunate because Park and
Russo (1996) and Park and Ungson (1997) argue that termination by acquisition and termination
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Like our study, Kogut (1991) examined the partner buyout decision through an option theory
lens. Whereas his study examines the role of exogenous factors on buyouts, our focus is on
endogenous uncertainty and the impact of national culture. To date, only Park and Ungson
(1997) have examined the role of national culture on the partner buyout decision. They reveal
some evidence that cultural distance increases the likelihood of buyout of the joint venture, even
after controlling for other important factors such as organizational and operational differences
between partners, the type of transaction, and the incidence of prior transactions between
partners. Unfortunately, since their focus was termination by dissolution, they do not develop
any a priori theoretical arguments about the determinants of buyouts. Neither do they offer any
empirical evidence regarding the effects of dimensions of culture other than cultural distance.
There are other reasons to believe that national culture may play an important role in the
partner buyout decision. Chang (1995) and Hurry et al. (1992) found that sequential investment
patterns were found to differ across U.S. and Japanese venture capital firms. Relative to U.S.
firms, Japanese firms exhibit incremental approaches to expansion. Subsequent to news
indicating venture success, Japanese venture capital firms tended to upgrade a venture investment
to a joint venture or acquisition, while U.S. firms tended to sell their ownership stake. Chang
(1995) questions whether the sequential investment pattern holds for western firms, reasoning
that cultural and institutional background of non-western firm favor an incremental and
evolutionary approach to investment. Although he does not test this proposition, he encourages
study of the matter.
Hofstede (1980) defined national culture as the collective programming of the human mind.
His dimensions of culture are well known and include uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
masculinity-femininity, and individualism and vary considerably across countries.
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Understanding which cultural dimensions bear upon the decision to buyout a partner may shed
. light on several important issues. For instance, investing firms in knowledge-intensive industries
would benefit from knowing how target firms from different cultures tend to respond to
sequential investment behavior by partners. This ex ante knowledge may prove helpful in
negotiating the terms of R&D equity collaborations. Similarly, collaborating firms would be
advised to understand whether foreign partners are likely to consider them an acquisition
candidate. At a broader level, national culture may have significant implications for
understanding the level and type of commitment firms make in emerging, high tech industries.
We explicitly examine the effects of national culture on the rate of partner buyout across
twelve different countries. Our hypotheses are developed using aggregate measures of cQltural
distance by Hofstede (1980) and Ronen and Shenkar (1985), as well as more specific dimensions
of culture relating to the investing firm. Using a time varying model, we test these hypotheses on
a sample of minority investments and joint ventures in the biotechnology industry. In the past
two decades, the biotechnology industry has grown explosively, largely due to the recognition
that biotechnology could disrupt old markets, create new products, and cheapen current
manufacturing process. Virtually every developed country has targeted leadership in
biotechnology as a national goal (Office of Technology Assessment, 1991).
BACKGROUND
Following Kogut (1991), we characterize R&D equity collaborations as a two-stage
compound option; whereby investing firms holding a limited equity stake in a target firm can
track knowledge development and (market and technological) opportunities in industries. Such
equity collaborations allow firms to maintain strategic flexibility to respond to industry trends
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that are difficult to predict. Following the initial equity investment, exercise of the first stage of
the option is represented by the full acquisition of a target partner. In the case of R&D
partnerships where an investing firm has taken a minority equity stake, partner buyout refers to
the acquisition of the R&D supplier/partner. Partner buyout for joint ventures refers to the
acquisition of the joint venture by one of the parents.2 Exercise of the second stage growth
option is represented by making further discretionary investments in research or commercial
opportunities resulting from the first stage commitment. In this view, equIty collaborations may
be initiated as a way to manage endogenous and exogenous uncertainty. Exogenous and
endogenous uncertainty have different effects on the decision to commit additional capital (Dixit
& Pindyck, 1994; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996).
Exogenous uncertainty cannot be reduced by the actions of the firm. In the case of emerging
technology industries, exogenous uncertainty exists when, for example, the technological
trajectory of the industry is indeterminate, industry infrastructure is lacking, and/or when key
legislation affecting the industry is pending. Given these conditions, the premature acquisition of
firms developing emerging technologies may impose considerable risks because the investing
firm gives up the option ofwaiting for new information that might affect the desirability or
timing of the investment. The ability to delay irreversible investment expenditures until
exogenous uncertainty is resolved can be an important source of flexibility in a project and
profoundly affect subsequent decisions to invest (McDonald & Siegel, 1986).
By contrast, endogenous uncertainty can be decreased by actions of the firm. Potential
sources of endogenous uncertainty for the investing firm include: expansion into unfamiliar
international markets, integration of firms from diverse cultures, initiation of R&D projects that
take time to develop, or inability to assess the target firm's knowledge. This form of uncertainty
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is primarily resolved by learning; that is, actually performing the activities associated with a
given project. Previous research suggests that greater endogenous uncertainty increases the value
of information, and thus, increases incentives to invest in knowledge generation or acquisition
(McCardle, 1985). In the presence of endogenous uncertainty, the key characteristic that makes
the investment in knowledge so attractive is the ability to temporarily or permanently suspend
further equity investment if the expected value of the completed projects declines due to
exogenous shocks. Roberts and Weitzman (1981) have shown that if learning is enhanced by
moving to the next stage of the project, there is an incentive to speed up the rate of conunitment.
We argue that it is the combination of endogenous uncertainty and enhanced learning by
moving to the next stage that motivates the decision to conunit incrementally. This staged
investment approach takes on value when internalizing the partner increases the rate of learning
about the project. In this sense, exercising the buyout of a partner is comparable to the exercise
of a call option on equities that pay dividends. In the presence of dividends (that come in th<;
form of learning advantages) there may be an incentive to exercise the partner buyout option
early. If the target turns out to have skills that are relevant for the partner but cannot be easily
transferred across firm boundaries after a brief interchange, a buyout may be the only viable
alternatives. Relative to arm's-length contracts, internalization facilitates transfer of
technological capabilities because the acquirer can tap into its repository of social knowledge that
structures cooperative action. According to Kogut and Zander (1992), this difference in the
marginal efficiency of technology transfer constitutes the ownership advantage of the firm. 3
Internalizing the partner firm may increase the efficiency of knowledge transfer, thus enabling
the firm to reduce future R&D costs so that growth opportunities can be exercised at a lower
cost.
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In sum, there are at least three important factors which need consideration when examining
determinants of partner buyouts: (1) the level of exogenous uncertainty, (2) the level of
endogenous uncertainty, and (3) the relative rate of learning inside versus outside firm
boundaries. Unless endogenous uncertainty (2) is present, the relative rate of learning inside
versus outside the firm (3) will have no consequence. This implies an interaction effect. In this
paper, we focus explicitly on the expected interaction between endogenous uncertainty and
learning. In the presence of endogenous uncertainty firms will invest sequentially when such
commitment yields information about future opportunities. Firms that learn more efficiently in
hierarchies are candidates to buyout their partners.
In the next section we describe our main thesis: that national culture traits and cultural
differences between partners should contribute to endogenous uncertainty and rates of learning in
hierarchy, and therefore, should bear upon the buyout decision.
HYPOTHESES
When valuable, but unexplored technology is resident in a target firm, investing firms differ
in terms of how learning activities are to be organized. Consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1991; Olie, 1994; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Powell, Koput & Smith-
Doerr, 1996), we argue that the cultural attributes of among investing firms are principal
determinants of how firms choose to organize learning activities. We motivate our hypotheses
using two of Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of national culture: power distance and uncertainty
avoidance. We believe that these two dimensions are the most relevant in the study of partner
buyouts for several reasons. First, as noted by Hofstede, "Of the four dimensions of national
culture, power distance and uncertainty avoidance in particular affect our thinking about
8
...... , n:..., ....... I <o~, _...b lI__...!l< <u,,"n; a
~"'_~ (1)1b< lc:Yd of<'_UDCataiDty. (:Illbo: lc:,,<:i f
<JMkw"""" DC<rtaiDly." J lbo: J<l li....... f I<o iq iaid< __ <JIJlJi o
l> ll ...... oI<..~~ 10 ueaI. o < J<lalift _ <J c m ol ...0<1<
....... _lIw::f_(J)wiIl .....""~ no;,.,.lo:o .. _<ff«t, Iol ..
a ... r""", «pli l, OIl Ibo upoc<ecl I<n<: o <_~ """,lUint .....
I<oraillJ- I "'" J'""<I'D< <Jf ............ \IIl<:CttaiIIl) fir o iU I oo <llliaU ..._JUdI
<O<'l\Illl""'''' i<l s lrJ t Ili o _ f I t< OJIlI<W'WIiUeo. I Udno """" #jfk-.I, i
iii..""*,,, ,,,.~ .. /w1"'" wI,1"''''''''''
I tho: ...... t o«tiOII ...., -., i 1 oI#; ..... """"""' <Ill...... ltOl.. .....,. <0".....
dilf"",,.,.. bd..""n~ """'"_.. ,1:1 , .. ......,...;0<)' """ ,.... gf Ieorn'l\& in
bicrorct>" ..... ,!l<",f_, """"'" boor opOIl "" tooJ'l'll dui."",.
il .alo.aI>lc:. loI-.pIoI<ol """""*'IY I r<OioX , ; . 'orF fml\, 1...uil\I fi ..... iff r
I. _ fl!2!: l< m;"I 0<11_ ..., 'n e <ItJOW<o:<l, OII'_"'OII t<Yi s "'""""'~ «.1·,
l , '1 , f>1OX. 'I :0IJ<. '1 <: > m 01. ...,o m. m: <ll, lol. ",,''''
c" 1"...1.<ri,,"... g ....,.,. 'lV<Slin,s: , lI < iDC,pa1
<!<I< IIn>nt. """ r _ .. co-p '''' nU"I O<IJ.,.... . __"'" )pOl!>oO >
'-'1io1 ,..... 01 IIIO o', i <m.i 01 ...in .. OIII,u"" a ..~< .... IU.U"';"')'
"""""""'. b ... I!IIO .-,..... i eJWOII> ""' ........ reIe i Ill 0I f!W'".,-
t.J w<> ....-KV<BI.-. inl,,, _\I)' fual< -of1ll 1 j_.... .Oli o..
<III,.... ""' Woac< oo UD«II i l uoidan< ill o < ff t IIi l oa...,."
•
•
organizations. Organizing always demand the answering of two questions: (1) Who has the
power to deCide what? And (2) What rules or procedures will be followed to attain the desired
ends?" (1991: 140).4 In contrast, Hofstede believes that while his other two dimensions,
masculinity and individualism, broadly reflect the values of the national culture, they imply little
about administrative practices within organizations. Consistent with the importance placed on
power distance and uncertainty avoidance inside organizations, these two dimensions have been
the most pervasive in research examining the behaviors of multinational corporation as
evidenced by the work of Erramilli (1996), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Kogut and Singh
(1988), and Shane (1993). Finally, Hofstede (1991) argues that various combinations of power
distance and uncertainty avoidance correspond directly to each of Mintzberg's (1983) preferred
authority configurations and coordinating mechanisms, thereby capturing both national and
organizational traits. It seems that power distance and uncertainty avoidance are the most
distinctive cultural dimensions which influence organizational structure and functioning
(Hoecklin, 1995).
We argue that power distance of a national culture will influence the degree to which the
investing firm can learn in hierarchy. Also, uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance are
argued to contribute to endogenous uncertainty in the equity partner relationship.5
Power Distance and Learning Inside versus Outside the Firm
As noted, Kogut and Zander (1992) point to the important differences in learning efficiency
across governance modes. They argue that it is more efficient to transfer complex knowledge
within the boundaries of a firm because learning processes are a function of shared values and
assumptions. If national culture embodies social knowledge and organizing principles, it
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therefore bears upon the expected efficiency of learning subsequent to partner buyout. Firms
from certain cultures may learn more efficiently when internalized, while the marginal rate of
learning in hierarchy may be lower for firms from other cultures. Hall (1976) argued that
cultures vary greatly in the processing of information and patterns of communication.
One cultural attribute that should influence the rate of learning in hierarchies relative to
collaborations is power distance (PD). Power Distance is defined as "the extent to which
members of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally"
(Hofstede, 1985: 348-349). As applied to organizations, control, decision making, and authority
are likely to be highly centralized (Hofstede, 1980). Acquiring finns from cultures characterized
as high PD operate most comfortably in hierarchy. In such countries, we expect the marginal rate
of learning or technology transfer to be highest in hierarchy. Indeed, Hofstede (1991) discusses
the implications of culture in an important learning context - in schools. In high PD cultures,
such as Japan, learning is structured and hierarchical. By contrast, learning is loose and more
unstructured in low PD cultures.
One might expect that firms from high PD cultures will move directly to outright
acquisition, and avoid the first stage equity collaboration. Consistent with this expectation,
Shane (1993) found that the higher the PD, the greater the likelihood of hierarchical control in
transactions. More recently, Erramilli (1996) found that firms from countries with higher PD are
more likely to seek majority ownership in foreign subsidiaries.
In the absence of endogenous uncertainty, firms from high PD cultures will acquire outright.
However, in the presence of endogenous uncertainty, they will invest incrementally, beginning
with the first stage equity collaboration. Several cultural attributes influence endogenous
uncertainty.
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Uncertainty Avoidance, Cultural Distance, and Endogenous Uncertainty
The study of national culture on governance modes has predominantly focused on
transaction cost explanations, where the cultural attributes or partner differences in national
culture are expected to moderate the ability of managers to perceive the potential for
opportunistic behavior by partners (Harrigan, 1985). As noted earlier, these transaction costs
were found to be a key determinant for dissolution of equity partnerships and joint ventures and
have been carefully articulated in the literature. Building on previous research, we argue that
uncertainty avoidance (UA) and cultural distance (CD) are two important contributors to
endogenous uncertainty.
Uncertainty avoidance (UA) is defined as the "degree to which the members of a society feel
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, which leads them to support beliefs promising
certainty and to maintain institutions protecting conformity" (Hofstede, 1985: 348-349). In an
organizational context, having high levels of UA leads managers to make less risky decisions and
develop coping mechanisms to control uncertainty, such as developing complex systems of rules
and regulations and following structured, ritual behavior (Hofstede, 1980).
Uncertainty avoidance was shown to be an important predictor of foreign market entry
modes. For instance, Kogut and Singh (1988) found that multinational corporations from
cultures high in UA are more likely to choose joint ventures or greenfield entry modes over full
acquisitions. These authors attribute this result to the fact that the uncertainty associated with
integrating the management teams of both subsidiary and parent firms is untenable. Therefore,
these firms are more comfortable with either a greenfield investment or establishing an equity
partnership with the host county target. Shane (1993) found that firms from high UA societies
favor licensing over acquisition-type entry modes.
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Given their proclivity toward risk avoidance, it is not surprising that finns from high UA
cultures prefer staged investment to outright commitment. At the same time, we expect finns
from high UA cultures to benefit from a transition toward hierarchy because of the added
structure in place to control opportunistic behavior. When finns are from cultures that are also
high in power distance, we expect there is added incentive to internalize the target finn in order
to learn about growth opportunities more efficiently. Our proposition that high PD, high UA
cultures are quicker to internalize appears consistent with arguments made by Hurry et al. (1992)
and Chang (1995), who asserted that Japanese finns, relative to U.S. finns, were more likely to
eventually acquire target firms. By contrast, U.S. finns are more likely to sell their equity
positions in target finns following the target firm's initial public offering. Indeed, according to
Hofstede (1980), the Japanese are ranked significantly higher on both PD and UA compared to
the United States.
Hypothesis 1: When established finns are from cultures ranked high in uncertainty
avoidance and high in power distance, partner buyouts are more likely.
In the passage above, we argued that established finns from cultures with higher power
distance learn more efficiently from their partners, and that the marginal incentive to acquire
their partners is highest when the relationship is confronted with endogenous uncertainty. While
uncertainty avoidance is one dimension that accentuates endogenous uncertainty, cultural
distance (CD) between the partners may also influence the amount of endogenous uncertainty.
Cultural distance is defined as the degree to which the home country culture of an investing firm
is dissimilar from that of the host country market and finns operating therein. When there is
more cultural distance between partners, the ability to effectively observe and predict
opportunism among partners is hindered (Kogut, 1988), leading to higher potential transaction
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costs. Here, transaction costs represent communication and control costs embodied in cultural
differences.
A large body of work has focused on initial governance choice and found cultural
differences lead finns to shy away from hierarchy (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Gatignon and
Anderson, 1988; Shane 1993). Other researchers have attended to the role of cultural distance on
the stability of existing partnerships, finding that it contributes to a higher rate of partnership
dissolution (Harrigan, 1985; Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Barkema,-Shenkar, Venneulen,
& Bell, 1997; Park and Ungson, 1997). More relevant to our study, Olie (1994) and Elsass and
Veiga (1994) argued that the blending of diverse cultures tends to be a challenging obstacle to
successful mergers. Indeed, cultural differences between finns was found to predict stress,
negative attitudes toward merger, and the lack of cooperation between finns subsequent to
merger (Weber, Shenkar, & Raveh, 1996).
These findings suggest that for existing partnerships, cultural differences raise the degree of
endogenous uncertainty facing partnerships, and the endogenous uncertainty facing prospects for
successful mergers of the finns. The successful transfer of knowledge among culturally distant
partners is an indeterminate process. This view is captured clearly by Luostarinen, who defined
cultural distance as "the sum of factors creating, on the one hand, a need for knowledge, and on
the other hand, barriers to the knowledge flow and hence also for flows between the home and
the target countries" (1980: 131-132).
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we argue that when endogenous uncertainty is combined with
more efficient leaming in hierarchy (i.e, high PD), partner buyouts should ensue. As a result,
when partners are culturally distant and the investing firm is from a culture that is high in power
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distance, we expect there to be added incentive to internalize the target firm in order to learn
about growth opportunities more efficiently.
Hypothesis 2: When partners are more culturally distant and the established firm is ranked
high in power distance, partner buyouts are more likely.
REsEARCH DESIGN
Sample
We drew a sample of minority equity collaborations and joint ventures involving dedicated
biotechnology firms (DBFs) from the North Carolina Biotechnology Center (NCBC) Actions
Database. This database includes detailed information regarding over 4,000 relationships and
transactions among firms in the biotechnology industry since 1978. In particular, the NCBC
database includes the following transaction characteristics: a) whether the transaction involved an
exchange of equity via a minority investment or a joint venture, b) the transaction date, c) the
identity and number of partners involved, d) the type of partners involved (i.e., DBF, established
firm, government, or university), e) each party's home country, f) the technological subfield, and
g) a general description of each transaction. All transactions were cross-validated with a similar
database, Bioscan. In the event that the transaction dates differed across sources, we used the
earlier of the two dates.
In studying the NCBC Actions database and comparing with Bioscan we collected
information on 618 equity collaborations. This original sample was reduced for three theoretical
reasons. First, our compiled data were restricted to transactions involving only two parties, a
target DBF domiciled in the United States and established firms having core businesses outside
of biotechnology. We believe it is easier to identify the integrated manufacturer as the holder of
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the call option to acquire, a belief consistent with Hurry et al. (1992). This is particularly
reasonable in cases where established fIrms take a minority equity stake in a DBF. These cases
constitute 83.8 percent of our fInal sample. Determining who holds the call option is more
challenging in joint ventures, where both parties contribute capital and knowledge to a jointly
owned and controlled entity.6 We control for likelihood that joint ventures may be bought out by
the DBF by including a joint venture dummy variable and by modeling joint venture buyouts by
the DBF fIrm as a competing event.
Second, we restricted our sample to include only four broad subfIelds: a) therapeutics, b)
diagnostics, c) agriculture (aglbio), and d) supplier/specialty chemical. These subfields account
for a large majority of all firms dedicated to biotechnology (Dibner, 1992). This focus on the
largest subfields was necessary because of our need to have a critical mass of public fIrms to
generate stock market indices for each subfield for our measure of exogenous uncertainty.
Finally, we focus on equity collaborations with DBFs domiciled in the United States. This
enabled us to better control for exogenous events specific to country boundaries. Given these
constraints on our database we identified 248 equity collaborations initiated between 1978 and
1995. Of these, we were unable to obtain the precise starting dates of 30 transactions, despite
supplementing our search using LexislNexus and SEC Schedule 13D mings.
We made considerable effort to verify the outcome of each partnership. If the December
1995 issue of Bioscan listed the equity partnership as ongoing, the transaction was coded as
right-censored. Otherwise, a systematic search was undertaken to understand the nature of the
transaction termination. NCBC and Bioscan data were supplemented with a search of Ernst &
Young Biotechnology Industry Reports, Predicast' s F&S Index of Corporate Change,
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LexislNexis, and SEC Schedule 13D filings. From this effort we were able to verify the timing
and outcome of 173 equity partnerships constituting our final sample.
Of the 173 transactions in our final sample, 23 were terminated by partner buyout by
established firms, 39 were dissolved, 21 were terminated by other means (6 joint ventures were
acquired by the DBF partner, 5 joint ventures were acquired by third parties, 10 DBFs were
acquired by a third party), and 90 were right censored; that is, they were still in effect at the end
of 1995.7 Table 1 provides a breakdown ofthe number of established f~s from each country
that have initiated equity collaborations with U.S. biotechnology finns. Here, we also list the
outcome of these equity collaborations for each country. While equity investments are most
prominently undertaken by firms in a few countries, there seems to be a clear difference in the
outcomes of these collaborations. U.S finns have a high percentage of partnership dissolutions
and third-party buyouts. Japanese finns and those from the United Kingdom have a significant
proportion of partnerships maintained, as do finns from Switzerland, Gennany, and Sweden.
While these trends show clear differences in country propensities regarding equity collaboration
outcomes, it is unclear whether these patterns are statistically robust when controlling for cultural
factors, finn-specific factors, and those relating to the value and exogenous uncertainty regarding
the technology. Furthennore, Table 1 does not consider the timing of the outcome event. For
example, while it is clear that a greater percentage of Japanese firms maintained their equity
stake than do U.S. finns, it does not help us understand whether Japanese finns maintained their
equity relationships longer than U.S. finns.
Insert Table 1 about here
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Model and Method
We selected a competing-risk, discrete-time event history analysis to test our hypotheses.
Event history models are especially appropriate for analyzing longitudinal data when the
dependent variable is a discrete event and the timing of the event's occurrence is of particular
interest. Competing risk is a special form of event history analysis that is used when the
dependent variable has two or more outcomes and the occurrence of anyone outcome removes
the subject from the risk of the other outcome(s). Buyouts are one of several ways in which a
partnership may be terminated. Other forms of termination include (a) dissolution of the
partnership, (b) acquisition of a biotechnology firm or joint venture by a third party, and (c)
acquisition of a joint venture by the biotechnology partner (rather than acquisition by the
established firm). Although we do not develop explicit hypotheses regarding these other forms
of termination, they do represent relevant "competing hazards" in that they preclude subsequent
occurrences of partner buyouts. To model the competing hazards, the hazard rate function is
defined as
(1) h/t} = limP/t,t + s)/s
S40
where h(t) is the hazard function associated with either partner buyout (j=1), partnership
dissolution (j=2); or other termination (j=3). Plt,t+s) is the probability that event type j occurs in
the interval between t and t+s, given that the partnership is at risk at time t.
Cox's (1975) partial likelihood method for parameter estimation allows us to incorporate
time dependence into the model, without specifying its form. The general form for the Cox
proportional hazards models estimated in this study is:
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where altJ may be any function of time, X(t) and Yare vectors of time dependent and time
invariant explanatory variables, and Pj and A, are vectors of estimable parameters. We used TDA
version 5.7 to simultaneously estimate the competing hazards model (Rohwer, 1994) with Cox's
partial likelihood method. We do not provide estimates for the baseline hazard function, alt),
since partial likelihood estimation discards this function. 8
The three events - buyout, dissolution, and other termination - were updated monthly. The
sample includes 9,843 monthly periods. The cultural variables were not time varying, but many
control variables were updated monthly.
Culture Variables
Hypothesis 1 is tested by multiplying Hofstede's (1980) well-known measures of
uncertainty avoidance and power distance to each country in our sample. Hypothesis 2 also
suggests a multiplicative function involving power distance and cultural distance. Our test
considers two alternative measures of cultural distance. First, following Kogut and Singh (1988),
we measured Hofstede's cultural distance (HCD) as a composite index based on the each of the
four cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980).
We also used a second measure of cultural distance is generated from a study by Ronen and
Shenkar (1985), who synthesized country clusters into nine groupings of countries with similar
work-related attitudes and values. The "Anglo" cluster involves Australia, Canada, Ireland, New
Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. All other countries in the study were
grouped into the other eight clusters. Using this data, we constructed a measure of cultural
distance such that when the established firm fell in the Anglo cluster, Ronen '8 cultural distance
(RSCD) was coded "0", otherwise it was coded"1".
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Clearly, cultural factors may not dominate partner buyout decisions. We argued earlier that
exogenous forces partially dictate how uncertain future payoffs are and whether a buyout option
is in-the-money. Other forces specific to the industry, the investing firm, and partner
relationship may also bear upon the buyout decision. In this section, we describe our attempts to
control for the factors found to be important by previous researchers.
Kogut (1991) argued that exogenous forces determine whether a buyout option is in-the-
money. He argued that when industry sales deviated positively from industry forecasts, joint
venture partners would seek to acquire the joint venture. His annual measures, shipment growth
and deviation from expected growth, are meant to capture the certainty to which joint ventures
operating in an industry have appreciated in value. Our measures of exogenous variables are in
the same spirit, but are measured differently. Whereas Kogut's study spanned several industries
and uses annual measures, ours concentrates only on biotechnology, and we consequently focus
on measuring exogenous forces within technological subfields on a monthly basis. Sales
measures are unreasonable in this industry because most firms have no revenues from sales. Like
Folta (1998), we measure subfield value and subfield (exogenous) uncertainty using stock market
indices generated from publicly traded firm in concentrating in particular biotechnology
subfields. These measures were constructed from stock prices that were gathered from the
Center for Research in Security Prices data base, and are described briefly below, but in more
detail in Folta (1998).
Differences in the expected value of growth opportunities across the four subfields
(Therapeutic, Diagnostic, AglBio, and Supplier I Specialty Chemical) with four stock indices that
were created from weekly returns of nine U.S. biotechnology finns specializing in the respective
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subfields. The subfield value of firm j was measured as the value of the monthly biotechnology
index for subfield m (whenj Em). These indices are weighted equally. Weekly values of the
indices were then averaged within each month to get monthly index values for each of the four
subfields. Subfield value was transformed by taking its natural logarithm to correct for positive
skewness.
Exogenous uncertainty was measured as the 26-week standard deviation of the log of
weekly returns for each of the four biotechnology subfield indices. The 26-week measure was
chosen because it provides enough history to produce a reliable measure of volatility, without
assuming constant variance over a longer period of time. Exogenous uncertainty was converted
to a monthly measure by averaging the weekly standard deviations within any given month.
Substantial literature has confirmed the importance of industry structure on the choice of
governance mode.9 We use average subfield R&D expenditures divided by average total
expenses to control for such effects. Conventionally, the relationship of R&D expense is said to
encourage integrative modes, such as acquisition, in order to provide adequate administrative
control for coping with higher degrees of human and dedicated capital specific to a transaction.
Using this logic, we might expect a positive relationship between R&D expense and partner
buyout.
Park and Ungson (1997) did not control for exogenous forces, but did find that a series of
dummy variables related to the partnership influenced the buyout decision. They found that
partners with the same SIC code were less likely to acquire their partners, partners having a prior
relationship were more likely to end in acquisition, partnerships involving technology transfer
were less likely to end in acquisition, and partnerships involving multiple products were more
likely to end in acquisition. We test for some of these same effects, but not all. By definition,
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our sample includes partners from different SIC codes and partnerships involving technology
transfer.
Park and Ungson (1997) have highlighted the important moderating role that prior
relationships have on the effect of cultural differences on partnership dissolution. While they did
not test for whether this same effect holds for partner buyouts, it may be reasonable to expect
prior relationships to moderate either the degree of endogenous uncertainty or the relative rate of
learning in collaboration versus hierarchy. We did not include prior relationships in our formal
presentation because to the extent that cultural dimensions influence the choice of prior
relationships with the partner, including a measure of prior transactions in the model would
confound our ability to interpret the results. In runs not reported, we did, include a dummy
measure for prior relationships, consistent with the measure employed by Park and Ungson, but
found no significant relationship in any of our models. Surprisingly, only 7.0 percent of the
partnerships had a prior relationship, a number significantly below Park and Ungson's 26.0
percent in the electronics industry. Apparently, it is more common to initiate a relationship with
equity transactions in the biotechnology industry.
Target firms having more commercial partners may not be attractive buyout candidates
because commercial opportunities to exploit their technology may be siphoned off by others. To
approximate the declining marginal threat of preemptive bidding or acquisition by each
additional partner, we used the natural logarithm of the target finn's number of current
commercial alliances. The number ofpartners was taken during the year of the event. In the
event of right-censored cases, the measure was taken in the last year of the observation window.
Bioscan provided this infonnation.
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If the transaction was ajoint venture an indicator variable was classified as a "1", and "0" if
it was a minority equity investment. Joint ventures are thought to provide a real option that is
more proprietary than is the case for minority investments.
Insert Table 2 about here
RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. Because of concerns
of multicollinearity between Uncertainty Avoidance and the Cultural Distance variables, as well
as the small number of events, we opted to present three full models relating to our hypotheses.
Table 3 presents the full (columns 2, 4, 6) and reduced (columns 1,3,5) models with the
parameter estimates for the hazard of partner buyout. To ascertain the degree of model fit,
likelihood ratio tests were performed on the incremental and full models. Each test produced a
chi-square statistic well above the critical value (p < 0.001), indicating that the overall fit is good.
The hypotheses for the individual interaction coefficients are tested under one-tail t-tests. In each
of the full models, the hypothesized interaction is positive and significant. These findings are
consistent with our expectations.
Insert Table 3 about here
In model 2, the positive coefficient on the interaction (p < 0.05) between Uncertainty
Avoidance and Power Distance is consistent with the expectations offered in hypothesis 1. It
suggests that established firms from cultures higher in UA and PD should be more likely to buy
out their partners.
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In models 4 and 6, both the positive coefficient on the interaction (p < 0.10) between
Hofstede's Cultural Distance and Power Distance as well as the positive coefficient on the
interaction (p < 0.01) between Ronen's Cultural Distance and Power Distance are consistent with
the expectations offered in hypothesis 2. It suggests that when partners that are more culturally
distant and established investors are higher in Power Distance there is an increased likelihood of
partner buyout.
Since the remaining variables in the models have no hypotheses related to them, we use a
two-tailed test to assess the significance of relationships. The only variable that demonstrated a
significant effect was Target Firm's Number of Partners. As was expected, it was negatively
related to the likelihood of partner buyout. This variable should approximate how proprietary the
buyout option is. The more partners a target partner has, the less proprietary is the option. The
variables relating to exogenous uncertainty, subfield value, and subfield R&D expense were not
significant. Neither was the indicator variable distinguishing joint ventures from minority
investments.
Table 3 also includes the competing hazard results for partnership dissolution in columns 7-
10. These results indicate that Uncertainty Avoidance and Ronen's Cultural Distance is
negatively related to the likelihood of dissolution. The latter result is consistent with those found
by Park and Ungson (1997) in studying the electronics industry. They did not examine the effect
of Uncertainty Avoidance. Furthermore, in comparison with the findings for the partner
acquisition models, these findings demonstrate that national culture attributes influence partner
dissolution differently. 10
Consistent with previous studies, we focused mainly on aggregate measures of cultural
distance. However, Hofstede (1980) suggests that partner differences for power distance,
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DISCUSSION
The role of national culture on governance choice has been frequently studied. However,
these studies have largely focused on the initial governance decision or partnership tenrunation,
giving little attention specifically to partner buyouts. This oversight is consequential, given the
high incidence of acquisition of joint venture and equity partners. By explicitly considering the
role of national culture on partner buyouts, we extend a growing body of literature that examines
the incremental nature of investments in joint ventures and partner firms in knowledge-intensive
industries. Although we are the not the first to characterize equity collaborations are compound
options, our study is the first to attempt to theoretically explain the role of national culture on
partner buyout. Partner buyout represents the exercise of the first stage option, while future
discretionary investments represent the exercise of the second stage option. Real option theory
suggests that firms should choose to invest incrementally in the face of endogenous uncertainty.
It also suggests that firms will be more likely to commit to the next stage when they can learn
more by committing, thereby reducing endogenous uncertainty.
We have built upon option theory to suggest that partner buyouts will be influenced by three
factors: exogenous variables, endogenous uncertainty, and the rate of learning inside versus
outside the firm. Our central argument is that attributes of national culture bears upon these
latter two factors. Specifically, we argue that both uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance
increases endogenous uncertainty. This is likely due to the inability to perceive the potential for
opportunistic behavior by partners, or information asymmetry between partners. As a result of
such uncertainty, established firms will shy away from aggressive commitment to growth
opportunities, they will invest incrementally. Firms from cultures that are high in power distance
are expected to transition to hierarchical governance because it is in hierarchies that they operate
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and learn most efficiently about growth opportunities. Thus, it is the combination of high
endogenous uncertainty and the ability (or prospects) to learn more efficiently after internalizing
the partner that leads to partner buyout.
Our empirical findings are consistent with the expectations noted above. Uncertainty
avoidance and cultural distance are argued to contribute to endogenous uncertainty, while power
distance is argued to impact the relative rate of learning in hierarchy relative to collaborations.
Established firms from high UA home country cultures are more likely to buyout partners when
they are also high in PD. Partners that are culturally distant are more likely to buyout partners
when they are also high in PD. These fmdings suggest that it is the combination of endogenous
uncertainty and efficient learning at the next stage that promote commitment via partner buyout.
They are robust to different measures of cultural distance emanating from work by Hofstede
(1980) and Ronen and Shenkar (1985). Distance measures using Hofstede's dimensions of
Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance seem to mostly explain endogenous uncertainty.
Upon examination of country values for UA, Japan is among the world's most uncertainty
avoidant cultures (about 1.5 standard deviations above the mean; see Hofstede, 1980: 315).
According to our research findings, Japanese firms might be expected to exhibit high levels of
anxiety with respect to both endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty. Therefore,
Japanese firms will place greater intrinsic and extrinsic value on maintaining the equity
collaboration. Indeed, our findings suggest that firms high in UA (including those from Japan)
are less likely to acquire their collaboration partners and less likely to dissolve the partnership.
These findings support those of Hurry et al. (1992) and Chang (1995) who found that Japanese
firms were more likely than U.S. firms to retain their holdings in international joint ventures.
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A Framework for Understanding Intentions of Foreign Partners
Using Hofstede's dimensions of Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance there is
potential to create a broad framework by which future studies can examine partner buyout
decisions in particular, and sequential investment more generally. In Table 5 we located
countries based on only two measures: Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance. Since these
measures are specific to the established firm, and not the relationship between partners, we can
develop a general framework of tendencies toward partner buyout. Since firms domiciled in
France and Japan are high in both Uncertainty Avoida.nce and Power Distance, we expect them to
be most likely to buyout their partners. The second most likely group to buyout partners
consists of firms high in Uncertainty Avoidance and medium in Power Distance: Germany, Italy,
and Switzerland. Finally, firms from countries that are medium in Qoth PD and UA (Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States) may also demonstrate a notion for partner
buyouts, although to a lesser extent. Established firms from other countries are less likely to
exhibit a tendency to buyout their partners either because there is low power distance or low
uncertainty avoidance.
Insert Table 5 about here
Of course, cultural distance is not depicted in Table 5. According to our theoretical
expectations, even established firms from uncertainty avoidance cultures may display a tendency
to buyout partners if they are culturally distant. The expectations presented in Table 5 can be
altered to reflect cultural distance. For example, France and Japan are especially likely
candidates for buyouts of U.S. partners because they are high on all three cultural attributes:
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Cultural Distance. The framework can be extended
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to partnerships not involving United States target firms. For example, the tendency for Japanese
firms to acquire Japanese partners may be muted somewhat because of a lack of cultural distance.
At the same time, because of high cultural distance, firms from Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States may demonstrate an increased tendency for acquiring Japanese
partners. We believe that these propositions are very deserving of more attention in samples
involving multiple industries and entry into multiple countries.
We should note several limitations of this study. Although our sampiing methodology was
comprehensive for nearly the entire life of the biotechnology industry, the number of partner
buyout events is small. Nevertheless, we managed to attain statistical significance for our key
variables and stability across a number of models containing firm-level and/or industry-level
control variables. A larger sample would allow disaggregation of joint ventures and minority
equity partnerships. Our study focused on a single industry, and sub-segments within that
industry. While these segments are distinct from one another, future research should attempt to
verify the expected relationships in other industries, including both R&D intensive and more
stable industries.
Parkhe (1991) suggests that formal training programs can enhance cultural understanding
and may moderate the relationship between cultural variables and the duration of global
alliances. These integrating mechanisms may have an important influence on the relative rate of
learning in joint ventures versus acquisition, and hence, may playa role in the buyout decision.
Unfortunately, since we lacked data on the extent of cross-cultural training programs, we could
not examine this issue. However, we believe that our theoretical framework offers an interesting
new opportunity to ascertain how integrating mechanisms may influence the relatively
unexplored phenomena of partner buyouts.
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Previous research has demonstrated that companies use collaborations when partnering with
culturally distant partners. Thus, our sample of equity collaborations may reflect some restricted
range of cultural distance. Indeed, means scores of cultural distance varied significantly when we
examined a broader sample of transactions involving both equity collaborations (0.64) and
outright acquisitions (.036). Thus, our study, and any study examining the effect of national
culture on partner buyout will suffer from such a bias. This will tend to weaken the results for
cultural distance. We have demonstrated, however, that even though we have sampled culturally
distant partners, power distance acts to moderate the partner buyout decision.
Overall, our study suggests that cultural attributes of the investing firm and cultural
differences between the investing and target firms playa significant role in predicting the rate at
which partner buyouts occur. It suggests that firms find value in flexibility in the presence of
endogenous uncertainty, and are quicker to exercise when buyout enhances the potential rate of
learning. The hypotheses developed here and the results we found offer some promising new
directions for future empirical research.
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ENDNOTES
1 Other evidence of partner buyouts include Kogut (1989), who found that 24.0 percent of
joint ventures were acquired by a partner within seven years, and Mikkelson and Ruback (1985),
who discovered that 13.6 percent of firms having initiated minority investments either acquired
or attempted to acquire their partner within three years of taking an initial equity stake.
2 We are not without precedent in defining the scope of this research to encompass both joint
ventures and minority investments (e.g., Hennart, 1991; Pisano, 1989).
3 For Williamson (1985), the ownership advantage of the firm results from its superior
mechanisms for coping with opportunism. .
4 Although Hofstede is largely famous for his 1980 IBM national culture study, he and his
colleagues later found several links between national culture and organizational culture
(Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990). In particular, the organizational
culture dimensions of needfor authority and needfor security correlated strongly with power
distance and uncertainty avoidance, respectively. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to only
power distance and uncertainty avoidance - cultural dimensions that capture both national and
organizational traits.
5 We are grateful to a reviewer who emphasized that cultural distance and uncertainty
avoidance are not equated to endogenous uncertainty. Indeed, they are merely constructs that
contribute to endogenous uncertainty. As pointed out on pages 6-7, endogenous uncertainty may
be represented by many factors.
6 Either partner may hold the option to acquire the joint venture. Who is most likely to
exercise the option in the case of joint ventures turns not only on the strategic intentions of the
partners, but the relative competitive strengths of the partners--the partner possessing unique
complementary resources being the more likely to acquire the weaker partner's stake (Hurry,
1993). Integrated firms investing in biotechnology have downstream skills in marketing and
distribution, and regulatory savvy (Arora & Gambardella, 1990). Although dedicated
biotechnology firms (DBFs) have important R&D capabilities, they frequently lack the cash
needed to invest in acquisitions. Furthermore, most integrated manufacturers of pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and agt'"iculture have a major goal of acquiring technical knowledge in biotechnology,
while only a handful ofDBF's aspire to become fully integrated (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1991). In our sample we found that six joint ventures were acquired by the
integrated partner and six joint ventures that were acquired by the DBF. Our focus on the
established firm as the holder also rests on our theoretical interest in understanding when firms
are more likely to commit to internalizing technical knowledge to capitalize on emerging
technologies, and not downstream skills.
7 Although the rate of acquisition (6.9 percent) by year three appears somewhat below rates
found in studies noted on page 3, to make our rate comparable we must also include acquisitions
by the DBF partner and allow for a three year window for the event to take place. In making that
adjustment we find that 10.0 percent of the total sample (14.8 percent of joint ventures and 8.9
percent of minority investments) was terminated by acquisition by one of the partners within 36
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months. This, then, is consistent with previous studies.
8 The Cox method uses only information about the relative order of duration times, instead of
the exact timing of events. Hence, the Cox method involves some loss of information,
potentially inhibiting model estimation. This same feature makes the Cox model an attractive
one when one has no prior expectations about time dependence. Another reason to question the
validity of the Cox partial likelihood model for our data is that our number of events is relatively
few. Although partial likelihood models are asymptotically efficient when the sample size is
large (Efron, 1977), when the sample size is small, the precision of the partial likelihood
estimates can be much less than that for maximum likelihood estimates (Coleman, 1981). We
estimated a second model using maximum likelihood. Maximum likelihood methods require
specification of a baseline hazard function. We chose the exponential specification because it is
the parametric equivalent to the Cox method. The results from that estimation produced a
pattern of relations identical to those found via the Cox estimation, with slightly less
significance. This supplemental analysis provided evidence for the robustness of the results
reported in this paper.
9 We also examined the effect of industry structure using number of rivals active in each of
the 123 product areas for each year throughout the publication of Bioscan (1987-1995). We did
not include this variable in the formal presentation because it had no substantive impact on the
model, and there was substantial coIinearity with other variables in the model (R&D Expense and
Subfield Value).
10 We also examined whether dissolution was influenced by an interaction between cultural
distance and power distance, and uncertainty avoidance and power distance. Log likelihood ratio
tests indicated no such interaction existed.
II Weber, Shenkar, and Raveh (1996) also used distance measures for Hofstede's individual
culture attributes, but focused on the impact on mergers and acquisition, not partner buyouts.
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Table 1: Cultural Measures and Outcomes of Equity Collaborations by Country of Corporate Headquarters
Cultural Measures Outcomes of Equity Collaborations
Actual (Percent)
Country Hofstede's Ronen's Partner Partnership 3rd Party Partnerships Total # of
UA PD Cult. Cultural Buyout Dissolution Buyout Maintained Establish
Distance Category -ed Firms
Australia 51 36 0.026 Anglo 1 (100%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1 1
I
Canada 48 39 0.138 Anglo 0(0%) 1 (50% 1 (50%) 0(0%) 2 1
I Denmark 23 18 1.745 Nordic 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2 2
France 86 68 1.617 Latin Europe 2 (40%)
I o (0%) 0(0%) 3 (60%) 5 2
Germany 65 35 0.630 Germanic 0(0%) 0(0%) 2 (28.6%) 5 (71.4%) 7 2
Ireland 35 28 0.530 Anglo 1 (50%) I (50%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2 1
Italy 75 50 0.650 Latin Europe 1 (50.0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1 (50.0%) 2 2
Japan 92 54 3.104 Far East 3 (13.6%) 3 (13.6%) 1 (4.6%) 15 (68.2%) 22 17
Norway 50 31 1.667 Nordic 0(0%) I (100%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1 1
Sweden 29 31 1.859 Nordic 1 (12.5%) 2 (25.0%) 1 (12.5%) 4 (50.0%) 8 4
Switzerland 58 34 0.528 Germanic 3 (17.7%) 1 (5.8%) 3 (17.2%) 10 (58.8%) 17 3
United Kingdom 35 I 35 0.083 Anglo 0(0%) 1 (7.1 %) 0(0%) 13 (92.9%) 14 3
United States 46 40 0.000 Anglo 10(11.1%) 28 (31.1%) 13 (14.5%) 39 (43.3%) 90 34
Total 23 (13%) 39 (23%) 21 (12%) 90 (52%) 173 73
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix8
Mean S.D I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Uncertainty Avoidance 53.143 18.157
2. Hofstede's Cultural Distance 0.632 1.078 I 0.786 *
3. Ronen's Cultural Distance 0.343 0.475 0.653 * 0.795 *
4. Power Distance 40.804 8.141 0.823 * 0.572 * 0.268 *
5. UA*PD 2290.158 1283.659 0.964 * 0.794 * 0.573 * 0.918 *
6. Hofstede's CD * PD 30.817 57.567 0.869 * 0.977 * 0.728 * 0.711 * 0.893 *
7. Ronen's CD * PD 15.023 22.129 0.835 * 0.879 * 0.940 * 0.568 * 0.807 * 0.876 *
8. Exogenous Uncertainty 0.3191 0.103 -0.035 * -0.006 -0.004 -0.027 * -0.029 * -0.014 -0.013
9. Subfield Value 5.736 1.095 0.050 * 0.050 * 0.099 * 0.026 * 0.052 * 0.056 * 0.106 * 0.098 *
10. Subfield R&D Expense 41.423 11.846 0.135 * 0.188 * 0.201 * 0.052 * 0.133 * 0.186 * 0.205 * 0.107 * 0.328 *
11. Target's # of Partners 3.118 1.625 -0.030 * -0.177 * -0.040 * -0.128 * -0.112 * -0.173 * -0.086 * -0.003 -0.021 * -0.076 *
12. Joint Venture 0.170 0.375 0.067 * 0.035 * 0.072 * 0.053 * 0.058 * 0.039 * 0.073 * -0.035 * -0.109 * -0.084 * 0.164 *
* Pearson correlations are significant at p < 0.05.
a Correlations are calculated using pooled cross-sectional and time-series data covering 173 equity partnerships and 9,843 one-month periods.
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Table 3: Partial Likelihood Estimates for Hazard of Partner Buyout and Pa,rtnership Dissolution
Partnership Acquisition Partnership Dissolution
Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (0)
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.0278 -0.0338 -0.0179t
(0.0197l (0.0356) (0.0102)
Hofstede I s Cultural Distance 0.1899 -0.7904 -0.2919
(0.2100) (0.6699) (0.1823)
Ronen's Cultural Distance 0.6992 -2.7992* -0.8394*
(0.4355) (1.5773) (0.4066)
Power Distance -0.0660 -0.0996* -0.0262 -0.0510* -0.0215 -0.0902** -0.0315
(0.0420) (0.0392) (0.0246) (0.0254) (0.0210) (0.0306) (0.0195
UA*PD 0.0012*.
(0.0006)
Hofstede's CD * PD 0.0219t.
(0.0136)
Ronen's CD * PD 0.0903**.
(0.0388)
Exogenous Uncertainty -2.0209 -1.8379 -2.3513 -1.8959 -2.3481 -1.8051 2.6796t 3.1736 3.2658* 2.5622
(2.2834) (2.2631) (2.2945) (2.3054) (2.2896) (2.2970) (1.5885) (1.6273) (1.6409) (1.5882)
Subfield Value -0.0581 -0.0775 -0.0612 -0.0666) -0.0736 -0.1045 0.1934 0.2007 0.2183 0.2045
(0.1951) (0.2020) (0.1962) (0.1976) (0.1954) (0.1988) (0.1637) (0.1631) (0.1638) (0.1634)
Subfield R&D Expense -0.0131 -0.0217 -0.0143 -0.0175 -0.0154 -0.0220 0.0148 0.0140 0.0151 0.0124
(0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0162)
Target Firm's # of Partners -0.4819** -0.3797* -0.4524** -0.4213** -0.4567** -0.3884* -0.4584*** -0.4982*** -0.4851 *** -0.4775***
(0.1627) (0.1678) (0.1659) (0.1632) (0.1637) (0.1622) (0..1291) (0.1303) (0.1310) (0.1289)
Joint Venture 0.6862 0.6543 0.6032 0.6359 0.6449 0.6671 0.1343 0.0792 0.0966 0.1550
(0.5065) (0.5057) (0.5020) (0.5008) (0.4986) (0.4954) (0.4955) (0.4911) (0.4917) (0.4976)
Log-likelihood Ratio -326.70*** -324.72*** -326.98*** -325.86*** -325.14*** -322.93*** 327.52*** 328.21*** 327.20*** 328.52***
a Standard error in parentheses
t p<O.IO; * p<0.05; ** p<O.OI; *** p<O.OOI
• One-tailed t-test for hypothesized relations
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Table 4: Partial Likelihood Estimates for Hazard of Partner Buyout
Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cultural Distance - Partner -0.4271
Differences in PD (0.6234t
Cultural Distance - Partner -1.3022
Differences in UA (0.7499)
Cultural Distance - Partner -0.1099
Differences in Individuality (0.8065)
Cultural Distance - Partner -0.5841
Differences in Masculinity (0.5007)
Cultural Distance - Partner -0.4084
Differences in (PD + VA) (0.3592)
Power Distance -0.0594 -0.0531 * -0.0323 -0.0404 -0.0647 *
(0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0305) (0.0263) (0.0269)
Differences in PD * PD 0.0201 *.
(0.0116)
Differences in UA * PD 0.0295 *.
(0.0137)
Differences in Individuality * PD 0.0042.
(0.0157)
Differences in Masculinity * PD 0.0183 •
(0.0145)
Differences in (PD + UA) * PD 0.0127 *.
(0.0064)
Exogenous Uncertainty -1.9168 -1.6697 -2.2012 -2.0129 -1.7917
(2.2621) (2.2915) (2.2884) (2.3173) (2.2811)
Subfield Value -0.1443 -0.0984 -0.0560 -0.0664) -0.1110
(0.2066) (0.2014) (0.1964) (0.1960) (0.2019)
Subfield R&D Expense -0.0195 -0.0204 -0.0140 -0.0143 -0.0212
(0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0175)
Target Finn's # of Partners -0.3839 * -0.3882 * -0.4597 ** -0.4460 ** -0.3734 *
(0.1659) (0.1635) (0.1659) (0.1641) (0.1652)
Joint Venture 0.5012 0.5850 0.6206 0.6045 0.5825
(0.5013) (0.5028) (0.5059) (0.5009) (0.4993)
Log-likelihood Ratio -323.94 *** -324.71 *** -327.43 *** -326.88 *** -324.14 ***
a Standard error in parentheses
t p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
• One-tailed t-test for hypothesized relations
40
.bI< .rtlo! Uk<IIb .l1....... r.... IIOJM<1 U.......... U1"'"
v_H_ (11 <0 (ll
ClIlanI~__
.(I,4m
i f..-.. ll I) , ;o.ol'
aolootoIlJoio<-. _ r......' _I JOl
iI'f rooon i (0.701
CoIn.nI DioloIu__
4, 0'1
iIf_. ll Jodi......" «I,IOi\S
CoItonIDi___ ,
IlilI<> .. ill IoI-.I;,,;, O~)
~ou.-..__ <-oor.n-.,. ill I). U I m)
_ i_
.(I.Ol'" .(I.O~!ll • =" - .(101\o01 "(o.mn 10.oml ,-, .~, -,
iIf.....,.. ill O • O 0,0201 ".
( . )
l'r...... io • I) O <r:l~·
o.oml
~ 10 ""'; lwi'r • I) _2 •
( , 1'"
iff--. ill w-d";'y • O ODIC.
ODI.,
~ ill I). • I) oJ/In'
O O))!,O
f, • -, U' l _ .1>6 1 _l, tlll _ J/ 1 _ ,1' 12 1 l t.lUO CUI1Jl OJ'")
oIJrodd ..... .... I..J <.- <- <-, .....,11) ( ,1 01 .1%01 , ( . '1)
_U.Ol!.<penoo 4D 1 <.- ....DI"'l -4.olOl .(1 :1
(ODl 1) . ' . ' ( .01111) (Il. 1)
....._·••.,_ o 'J • .... 1 • ......m .. .(I,"""'" , • .(I.l lO •
O,I l ((I. 1l1 o.l l'l (1 01 lQ. 6l )
kOooV_ O.lOll O. ISO .~ .~, "rn
IO.1( 1 O.lOlS .~, ,~, (1, 1
'-"I-libJ0b00d _ ·ill.'" ... ·1:!<.71"· _l 741'" _11lLU'" - 1 . ...
·-.1_10 ............
I -) • llJll," P 1:'" (I.(IOl
o<- OIoo!'_ r..~ml.._














* The darker the background the more likely firms from these countries are to buyout their partners..
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